The Culture of Peace
for the Security of
Future Generations

peace
culture

Peace, Human Security and
Human Development

Desirée Campagna
Pietro de Perini
Marco Mascia

Higher Education
Volume Two

2

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"Everyone talks about peace but no one educates for peace. In this world, they educate for competition, and competition is the beginning of any war. When we educate to cooperate and be in solidarity with one another, that day we will be educating for peace."

María Montessori

"…It is time for all to commit to be a force for good, a force for peace: to support the project "Culture of Peace for the Security of Future Generations", contributing to a more secure future for mankind and for the coming generations…"

Michael Frendo, *"Committing to Culture of Peace"*

Kuwait
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The Culture of Peace for the Security of Future Generations

Higher Education | Volume two

Peace, Human Security and Human Development

Edited by

Luigi Moccia

Written by

Desirée Campagna

Pietro de Perini

Marco Mascia

Supervised by

Touhami Abdouli

The Foundation Offices

Kuwait

P.O. Box 599, Al Safat, 13006
Tel: (+ 965) 22415172
Fax: (+965) 22455039

Egypt

P.O. Box 509, Al-Dokki 12311, Al-Giza
Tel: (+ 202) 33027335
Fax: (+202) 33030788

Italy

Via Tuscolana 650, 00173 Rome
Tel: (+ 3906) 57335212
Fax: (+ 3906) 57335366

www. albabtaincf.org
info@ albabtaincf.org

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Acknowledgments

On September 7, 2017, I submitted a proposal to the General Assembly of the United Nations. If the proposal succeeds in being implemented, it will be a milestone for future generations. Its realization certainly depends on our united efforts, especially on our sincere will and determination to serve humanity. The proposal is a project entitled "Culture of Peace for the Security of Future Generations" and requires that all actors of the international community commit themselves to introducing special lessons on Culture of Peace to their educational programs and materials, starting from kindergarten and on to primary education, high school and university. This project has been welcomed by the General Assembly of the United Nations to which I wish to extend my warm thanks. The approval of the project represented an incentive for me to move on to the next steps in the concretization of my idea. On November 22, 2017, the Foundation opened in Rome Abdulaziz Saud Albabtain's chair for Culture of Peace and took care of all its activities. We have entrusted the task of supervising it and teaching Culture of Peace to the European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, which includes 100 universities from around the world. I have also decided to set up an international committee to oversee and guide in facilitating the task of those who will be teaching Culture of Peace to future generations. It was then that I presided over the first meeting of this Committee in Rome, on 23 November 2017, the day after the opening of the Peace Chair at the Centre of Altiero Spinelli at the University of Rome. We, then, held a second meeting in Rome on 28 January 2018 (two consecutive days), during which we outlined the content of the manuals. We also met in Lisbon, Portugal, on 4 and 5 April 2018, during the International Symposium held by the Gulbenkian Foundation on higher education during 'emergency times,' and also on the occasion of

receiving the Portuguese government's seal from President Marcelo Rebelo. As a first step, we all agreed to prepare a "model manual", to guide experts in their composition of manuals for all education levels. The experts took into consideration all the suggestions given by members of the committee, thus combining the best of propositions in drafting the proposal.

On September 5, 2018, I presented this Manual to the General Assembly of the United Nations at the high level Forum on Culture of Peace. It was accepted by the participants with a special request to add lessons on different tools to protect the cultural heritage.

Since that, as a second step the overseeing committee engaged the expert teams specialized in manuals composition. The selection of members of the teams was done on the basis of three criteria:

- **Experience in teaching and in subject matter;**

- **Mastery of at least two languages (English and French) besides the mother tongue, in each country;**

- **Geographical diversity: experts from at least two or three continents or more.**

The overseeing committee recommended the adoption of the best examples from diverse schools as well as the implementation of an English educational system in its British, American as well as Anglophone forms. It also urged the consideration of other effective educational approaches in other systems such as the Finnish, German and Italian ones.

The manuals are currently being drafted by three teams of specialists relying on the model manual which was presented to the UN General Assembly on September 5, 2018. These teams are:

- **Team of kindergarten, primary and basic education experts.**

- **Team of secondary education experts.**

- **Team of higher education experts.**

We urged the teams to finalize the manuals by the end of April 2019, so that we could present them to our guests at the first edition of the World Forum for Culture of Peace to be organized by the Foundation at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, on June 13, 2019.. A number of world leaders as well

as political, social and cultural actors will be present at this Forum. In order to ensure the comprehensive completion of our work within the deadlines, the overseeing committee entrusted Professor Touhami Abdouli, the General Director of the Foundation, with the coordination, follow-up, and supervision of the manuals. So my deep thanks to all the talented expert teams who composed the manuals and did respect the deadline:

- **Luigi Moccia,** University of Roma Tre, Italy.

- **Desirée Campagna,** University of Padova, Human Rights Centre "Antonio Papisca", Italy.

- **Pietro de Perini,** University of Padova, Human Rights Centre "Antonio Papisca", Italy.

- **Marco Mascia,** University of Padova, Human Rights Centre "Antonio Papisca". Italy.

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- **Maria Ponce De Leon,** Temple University, Rome.

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- **Mahfoudh Elarem,** Sousse International School.

- **Ashley Muench,** University of North Florida, Jacksonville.

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- **Njal Haugland,** University of Birzeit.

- **John Teem,** San Diego State University.

- **Jonathan Mason,** Faculty of Arts, Tunisia.

- **Elizabeth Marques,** French School of Kuwait.

- **Imene Gramy,** French School of Kuwait.

I would like also to extend my deep thanks to the overseeing committee, which I was honoured to chair, for its continued support in our global humanitarian project:

- **Michael Frendo,** former Maltese Parliamentary Secretary and Minister of Foreign Affairs, currently a Vice-Chairman of the Venice Democracy Commission.

- **Charles Nothomb,** President of the North-South Dialogue Foundation, former Belgian Foreign Minister.

- **Patrizia Martello,** President of the World Academy for Poetry.

- **Laura Troisi,** Secretary General of the World Academy for Poetry.

- **Terje Rød-Larsen,** President of the International Peace Institute in New York, and the former U.N. envoy.

- **Adam Lupel,** Vice President of the International Peace Institute in New York.

- **Nejib Friji,** Director of the International Peace Institute for the Middle East and North Africa.

- **Luigi Moccia,** President of the Centre of Altiero Spinelli, Rome.

- **Michele Capasso,** President of the Mediterranean Foundation.

- **George Ulrich,** Secretary General of the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratization.

- **Touhami Abdouli,** Director General of Abdulaziz Saud Albabtain Cultural Foundation and former Secretary of State of Tunisia for European, Arab and African Affairs (2011-2016).

In conclusion, these manuals could be enriched by your valuable remarks as they are designed for Culture of Peace which is always in process….

Culture of Peace does not need proof and evidence because it is evidence of itself.

Abdulaziz Saud Albabtain

Kuwait, May 1, 2019

Foreword

Committing to Culture of Peace

These "Manuals" (from kindergarten to elementary schools, high schools and universities) to be presented to the international community within the different activities of the "World Forum for Culture of Peace" that will be organized by the Albabtain Cultural Foundation on June 13, 2019, at the International Court of Justice (Palace of Peace) in the Hague, Netherlands, represent another truly worthy achievement of a man who, successful in his business ventures, dedicated himself to literature, to poetry, and to the furtherance of the idea of humankind living together in harmony, respect and understanding, which lie at the heart of Culture of Peace.

Abdulaziz Albabtain is a peaceful voice from the Arab World, passionately furthering an ambitious project to create an international community - within our reach - where we all together jointly assert our "common commitment" for the "security of future generations" by providing them with an educational formation in Culture of Peace.

Certainly, it is in our much maligned Europe, that we have managed to keep a peace for over seventy (70) years by undertaking a unique political, economic and legal construction on the bloodied soil of the very continent that was the cause of two World Wars in one century.

In the context of a shared European perspective, when we speak of Culture of Peace, the vision of the European founding fathers and its actual implementation are central to the theme. The choice was to seek political integration through economic integration and the first step was the sharing of what at the time were the raw materials of war with the European Coal and Steel Community. That dedication to peace is at the heart of the European project in the proven belief that the more the peoples and States of Europe manage to suc-

cessfully share political and economic sovereignty the less vulnerable they are to fall victim to the isolationism which is the breeding ground of war and conflict.

The achievement of the European Union stems also from the same post-World War II spirit of a collaborative and internationally linked world where the nation-state joins up in international organizations such as the United Nations and its Agencies. The Charter of the UN, in its very preamble makes it clear that "the peoples of the United Nations" have joined together "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security".

For long, in the immediate post-war and in my generation, we took for granted that these noble aspirations had been embraced by the whole world and that the commitment to the direction of international cooperation and sharing of decision-making was unswerving.

Worryingly, we are witnessing events and political choices which do not allow us to take this trend for granted any more. The euphoria of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of most of Europe soon subsided with the indiscriminate attacks on civilians by non-state terrorist groups that engendered widespread fear in the name of extremism, religious or otherwise.

The sharing of sovereignty in the European Union is under assault from the forces of populism and nationalism: the model of collaborative internationalism which is at the heart of peace in our times has given rise to new walls of nationalism instigated by many factors, not least the issue of massive economic migration, isolationism and nationalistic rhetoric of grandeur.

Perhaps never more than now, therefore, has there been a need to further Culture of Peace in our world - and the project of "Culture of Peace for the Security of the Future Generations" not only comes at an appropriate time but also takes on greater significance in the attempt to ensure that Culture of Peace, as the basis of security for future generations wins the hearts and minds of the new generations.

That great champion of peace and non-violence, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, better known as the Mahatma, put is very aptly, when he said:

"If we are to teach real peace in this world, and we are to carry on a real war against war, we shall have to begin with the children".

And the Mahatma was someone who knew about the consequences and suffering of choosing the road of non-violence to achieve his political goal of independence for his great nation. His dedication to non-violence as a matter of principle and belief was not a matter of policy. His commitment to discredit the dictum that the end justified the means was based on his conviction that the means were actually an integral part of the end.

"Non-violence is not a garment to be put on and off at will. Its seat is in the heart, and it must be an inseparable part of our being", he taught. And "The attainment of freedom, whether for a person, a nation or a world, must be in exact proportion to the attainment of nonviolence for each".

In showing effectively that there is an alternative to violence as a means to achieve political aims, Gandhi is a prime example of a champion of Culture of Peace in our world.

The same philosophy permeates the principles guiding the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization, UNESCO. Indeed, as stated in the Memorandum to a Letter by a number of States that requested for the first time a discussion on Culture of Peace in the United Nations General Assembly, the concept of Culture of peace and its propagation, "dates back to the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), adopted more than 50 years ago, wherein that organization is called upon to construct the defenses of peace in the minds of men because 'a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of Governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and ... the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind'."

Doing exactly this: the founding of Culture of Peace upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind, therefore, is a task to which we are all called: to ensure the security of future generations.

However in doing so, we must steer clear of the facile mixing up of appeasement for peace, lest we suffer the fate of Chamberlain's waving of his agreement with Hitler in 1938 as proof of "peace for our time". There is no peace in the mollification of tyrants and in the resignation to evil, as was the evil of Nazism.

To achieve peace for our time, for which the believers of all three Abrahamic religions pray, we must ensure a peace of substance. While no one wants to fill in the cemeteries with the victims of war and conflict, neither do we aspire to a peace of the cemeteries.

There was no peace without justice, and it is right and just to continue to pursue that justice even today. Equally, there is no peace for the oppressed if there is no freedom for them. As Hanna Nassar, the former mayor of Bethlehem, that birthplace of the Prince of Peace, once told me when I visited him as Malta's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2005: "We are not witnessing peace, we are witnessing piece by piece".

Dialogue and Understanding are the tools of Peace. Diplomatic effort at resolving conflict and international tensions must be unceasing, resolute and continuous in the face of what may seem to be a situation of hopelessness. In the spirit of the words of Mother Theresa, "Give but give until it hurts". We must pursue peace with that extra determination, until it hurts.

Peace must have a dividend. In this context, the international community must ensure that peace always has a dividend. And that dividend is upheld and is shown as a carrot for other situations of conflict which require resolution. When we place the violent actors on the same plane as the non-violent actors, when we do not show reward and progress for those who give up violent struggle for peaceful and diplomatic means for change, we are discrediting the value of peace. Peace must have a dividend.

There is no peace without reconciliation. After political change, in the turmoil of events, we need leaders who place a high value on reconciliation as a means of peace and security for future generations. Perhaps no better example can be found other than the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-

sion which held public hearings on human rights violations for victims and perpetrators alike. Of course no one can deny that there is a fine line between dispensing justice and granting amnesty in the search for reconciliation and no one reality is the same as the other – but there may be times when, under given conditions, seeking reconciliation becomes paramount for the nation to move forward in peace.

Still in furtherance of peace, reconciliation requires historical memory and the recognition of past mistakes. Speaking recently at the International Peace Institute, my friend and former colleague, Erkki Tuomioja, rightly stated that even where there are peace agreements, the unaddressed history you think you left behind can return "to haunt you and at worst can lead to renewal of conflict." For, "if you do not know your history, you cannot see into the future." In this regard, he mentioned the Armenian genocide the definition of which is still contested between Turkey, Armenians and others, and the slowness of Germany to recognize atrocities in what is now Namibia, and the British and the French in India and Algeria.

Real security lies in a global culture of peace and not in the balance of armaments and the race to the bottom. No military strength can protect all citizens in all circumstances and everywhere within one's territory. Protection lies not only in collaboration with others in security matters and exchange of information but also in the victory of Culture of peace which in itself is a pre-emptive strike against war and conflict.

Peace and security lie in international good neighbourly collaboration in a world which needs to address its own global challenges of climate change, global warming and extreme weather and the ever growing wealth divide where just eight human beings own the same wealth as 3.6 billion people making up the poorest half of humanity.

Peace also requires a social security net provided by each Nation State globally. In many circumstances, extreme and hopeless poverty, morally unacceptable, is also the breeding place and recruiting ground of extremism and violent conflict.

Of course, it is tautological that, even in wartime, with the collapse of peace, no peace is achievable without renewed political process and engagement to stabilize and to heal.

Is the Abdulaziz Saud Albabtain project a project for dreamers? Perhaps it is, but dreaming a better future has been the basis for all true progress for mankind. And at the end of the day peace is no dream for those who have achieved it: it is a fundamental and precious reality to all of us in our time and the basis for all other facets of life. As good citizens, we must also secure it for future generations.

The drive for the development and furtherance of Culture of Peace therefore must continue, in our schools, in our universities, within the nation-state and on a multilateral and international level. We must continue to fight the good fight: that greatness is not expressed in nationalism, in military strength, in the nostalgia of former empire or in isolationism, that force does not overwhelm justice and that war cannot become more appealing than peace.

The imploration of Abdulaziz Saud Albabtain, on the 7th of September 2017, then in the 5th of September 2018, in addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations to launch a project entitled "Culture of Peace for the Security of Future Generations" where the entire international community, governmental and non-governmental would fashion peace based education and cultural manuals on peace in education globally "from kindergarten to elementary schools, high schools and universities" finds resonance in a General Assembly Resolution entitled "Promotion of religious and cultural understanding, harmony and cooperation adopted on 3 November 2005":

"Encourages Governments to promote, including through education, as well as the development of progressive Manuals and text books, understanding, tolerance and friendship among human beings in all their diversity of religion, belief, culture and language, which will address the cultural, social, economic, political and religious sources of intolerance, and to apply a gender perspective while doing so, in order to promote understanding, tolerance, peace and friendly relations among nations and all racial and religious groups, recognizing that education at all levels is one of the principal means to build Culture of peace".

Peace requires also inter-religious dialogue, which I know is so close to the heart of Abdulaziz Saud Albabtain and for which he has contributed so much throughout his life work. Peace requires therefore a renewed interest in the values which are the foundation stones of the major world religions. In its programme "Towards Culture of Peace", the United Nations rightly includes promotion of interreligious and intercultural dialogue, understanding and co-operation for peace in interconnected processes.

True enough, religions can be divisive and themselves a source of conflict. John Lennon and his famous song "Imagine" would not argue with that. But religions can and should also be a source of common and shared values. Peace is at the heart of Islam, (from Salem - making peace) and of Christianity (love your enemies) as in Judaism where shalom also means wellbeing and therefore showing peace as not just the opposite of war but as the ideal state of affairs.

It is time for all to commit to be a force for good, a force for peace: to support and commit to the work of Abdulaziz Saud Albabtain and of his Cultural Foundation project " Culture of Peace for the Security of Future Generations", contributing to a more secure future for mankind and for the coming generations.

Michael Frendo[1]

INTRODUCTION

"Establishing lasting peace is the work of education…."

"Everyone talks about peace but no one educates for peace. In this world, they educate for competition, and competition is the beginning of any war. When we educate to cooperate and be in solidarity with one another, that day we will be educating for peace."

María Montessori

Peace means education…If a child learns well in his early years, he will not forget, and the rules of living in peace… will serve as a guiding beacon.

Abdulaziz Saud Albabtain.

The Rationale

The project "Culture of Peace for the Security of Future Generations" proposed by the "Albabtain Cultural Foundation" intends to offer a meaningful contribution to the field of Strategic Studies, at all educational levels. The Manuals are designed to promote Culture of peace as a viable and essential component not only within educational institutions, but with an extended influence to local and international government policy-making agencies as well as religious communities.

The "Culture of Peace project" is envisioned to be introduced in the classroom at an early age and proceed on to all subsequent levels. It is a long term process which should provide both children and young adults with an awareness and respect for human values and rights. In addition to developing the skills of active listening, dialogue and mediation, its proposed courses with diverse levels of competency, include topics such as: guidelines for peace in today's world peace and conflict theories; international/ regional organizations; international treaties and conventions; intercultural dialogue: the role of religious institutions and communities in the current geopolitical context; and new threats to peace in the global context: resources, international terrorism, organized crime; as well as numerous others.

Why Culture of Peace?

Increasingly, international actors and analysts are advocating a holistic understanding of peace, to move from a definition of peace as the absence of conflict towards one of positive peace. Looking at peace from this perspective requires a shift in focus from identifying and combating the causes of wars to understanding the factors that "foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies, free from fear and violence."[1] In fact, people would do anything to live a peaceful life. Peace, however, is not a certainty since wars are omnipresent in almost every society, ranging from civil wars to genocide. Moreover, due to the precariousness of the socioeconomic condition of a large portion of society, the inalienable rights of peace and security are often overlooked or thought of as luxuries. Those rights, however, have been proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as principled values which serve as an ethical code for people to follow all over the world, despite ethnic, religious, cultural, or racial diversity. When countries and people are victimized by the ravages of armed conflicts, it is arduous to guarantee respect for Culture of Peace. This is when education must step in and perform a major role. Indeed, to transcend the destructive repercussions of wars, Culture of Peace has to be established. UNESCO's Constitutional Statement confirms this when it states: "since wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed". In other words, it is of utmost importance to educate and enlighten people in order to guarantee them the knowledge and respect of their rights in the short and long terms.

It is insufficient to call for peace, long for it, or send an outcry against wars. Rather, it is imperative that we come to terms with the fact that education is the only valid weapon which will enable the citizens of the world to finally attain the long sought after peace. The study of Culture of Peace together with Human Rights should not be solely regarded as an academic topic of education, but rather as an essential tool for attaining behavioural change in favour of a more peaceful society which respects human rights.

In order to achieve the objective of establishing peace and respect for Culture of Peace in education, the aim should be to enrich and deepen the stu-

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(1) NYU Center on International Cooperation. "Pathways to Peaceful and Just Societies", available at: http:// cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ peaceful_just_inclusive_societies_unga_270916.pdf.

dents' concept of peace in content as well as in its enactment. Teachers should be both informative and active. In other words, they not only need to provide their students with information but also present activities that implement the acquired information into daily life behaviour. Instilling peace in the minds and hearts of the learners will necessarily go hand in hand with Culture of Peace education; an education that advocates the universally acclaimed values of freedom, justice, and equality. If these values were to prevail, people would be able to coexist peacefully, in a conflict-free society.

Culture of Peace encompasses a wide range of subjects and sub-topics, but despite how far-reaching and fast-growing its realm may be, its objective derives from a simple maxim: doing unto others as you would have them do unto you, which is basically synonymous with human responsibility within a framework of shared humanity.

In order for Culture of Peace to be respected and diffused around the globe, universal peace values should comprise an integral part of education from the very first contact with a school setting, namely in kindergarten. Moreover, Culture of Peace education requires a combination of high-quality teaching and learning, intended to provide a well-balanced and fulfilling scholastic environment, which inevitably results in a better balanced and more contented society. Culture of Peace education should offer students the guidance and assistance needed to become responsible, law-abiding, and humane citizens in the real world and such can be achieved by setting up a comprehensive Human-Rights' education enriched with a goal-oriented, thematic, and tangible Manual, adaptable to all the subjects.

These Manuals seek to provide educators of all levels, from kindergarten through higher education, with the guidelines and teaching materials required to inspire and reinforce an awareness of Culture of Peace in learners. Though the manuals are intended to serve as guidebooks for teachers who seek to cultivate Culture of Peace in the classroom, the manual should not be considered binding, but rather adaptable and emendable whenever necessary, in accordance with the feedback of the scholastic community: teachers, experts, parents, students, etc. That being said, it is hoped that these manuals will not cease to evolve and will serve as means to an end rather than an end in itself.

'Actions speak louder than words'

One cannot give what one does not have. Similarly, one cannot teach something one does not know and preach about something one does not personally abide by. In other words, students do not need to be solely instructed and informed about Culture of Peace at school. For Culture of Peace education to be effective, students need to learn not only how to hold Culture of Peace values in high regards, but also how to hold the destructive deep-entrenched ills in contempt. To do so, teachers must seek to show respect for Culture of Peace in their methods of teaching. For example, a teacher cannot lecture to students about the importance of justice as a value, and then use unfair treatment. That would be contradictory to say the least, and would discredit the teacher in the eyes of the students, who would not be convinced to take the value of justice seriously. Notwithstanding the fact that some academic subjects are not directly associated with Culture of Peace, instructors of any given subject can foster Culture of Peace values in their students through the set of behaviours they try to promote within the classroom such as mutual respect, acceptance, trustworthiness, dependability, solidarity, equality, and equity. These values carry the same weight in the Humanities and the Social Sciences as they do in the Sciences and Mathematics.

It is advisable that teachers include Culture of Peace in the content of their subjects as well as incorporate classroom activities centred on real life issues such as freedom, equality, and justice. In this vein, Ian Lister proposes the following guidelines for a Human Rights school, which could be very useful for the school of Culture of Peace since the Human Rights are basic elements in the education of Culture of Peace. The standards he suggests are tentative ones; nevertheless they are a good set of starting points for any school community that would live by principles of Culture of Peace. In the following quotation of Ian Lister we are replacing the term of Human Rights School by Culture of Peace School as the last necessarily contains the Human rights:

. *"- Its general structures and practices reflect a concern for the Procedural values which underpin (Culture of Peace), toleration, fairness and respect for truth and for reasoning;*

- It will respect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all its members, including the students, acknowledging that the members have these rights and fundamental freedoms by virtue of their common humanity;

- All are entitled to these (principles of Culture of Peace) and freedoms because of their common humanity, and there will be no discrimination against anyone on grounds of race, religion, social class or gender. In particular, the (Culture of Peace School), will regard and respect children and women as part of common humanity. It will guard against 'unconscious' or 'unintentional' racism and sexism;

- No one in the school should be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

- Any punishment must be preceded by due process and a fair hearing;

- Everyone will have the right of freedom of opinion and expression, and of peaceful assembly and association. Students will be able to form, and belong to, issue-related groups which respect the ideals and procedures of (principles of Culture of Peace);

- The education practiced by the (Culture of Peace School), will be directed to the full development of the human personality, and will show a concern for brain and hand, and for intellect and emotions;

- Through its structures and its manual, the (Culture of Peace School) will promote understanding, tolerance and friendship between people of different national, ethnic or religious groups and a concern for the maintenance of peace. It will help its students to acquire the attitudes and skills necessary to facilitate peaceful social change;

- It will recognize that everyone has duties and obligations, as well as rights and freedoms, and that these will include duties to the community and obligations to respect the rights and freedoms of others;

- It will be aware of the relationship of rights and freedoms and duties and obligations, and that the relationship between the rights and freedoms of one (or of one group) and the rights and freedoms of another (or of another group) may be contentious issues. The (Culture of Peace) school will not be without - or seek to be without - conflicts and issues, for they are an essential element in political and social change[1]"

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(1) Ian Lister, Teaching and learning about human rights, School Education Division, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1984

Making one's teaching gravitate around the principles of Culture of Peace can be very rewarding even beyond the scholastic environment and benefit the whole community. The manuals do not intend to overburden teachers with extra-manuals tasks, but rather it is designed to serve as a referential didactic tool when including Culture of Peace values in the teaching of already-existing subjects as well as in promoting positive classroom behaviour. However, the manuals for Culture of Peace are not intended to be considered inflexible dogma; indeed, they are subject to ratifications and other suggestions when necessary. Basic Culture of Peace values will be examined and taken into consideration when choosing the different activities and tasks in order to promote an open-minded and considerate conduct at school. The different activities suggested as part of the manuals will not only be suited to beginners but also to students of more advanced levels, due to the universality of its message.

How to foster Culture of Peace in the classroom?

Teachers/ professors are encouraged to disregard conventional didactic methods when setting up the pillars for Culture of Peace teaching. The student needs to feel part of a close-knit unit in a secure atmosphere. In other words, the inalienable rights of the students need to be secured and guaranteed in order that Culture of Peace teaching is efficient and not incongruous with reality. Hence, the learning process cannot be passive, but it must engage the student proactively while placing him/her at the centre of the educational process.

Additionally, Culture of Peace education put into action should not be solely limited to epistemological and conceptual facets. It needs to be interdisciplinary as the focus will be allocated equally to three different fields: the first one dealing with information and knowledge; the second one with practice and projects; and the last one focused on dialoguing and deliberations. This approach to Culture of Peace education should synchronize the epistemological component with the practical one. For Culture of Peace to be assured and carried out in real life, its focus needs to be directed towards changing hackneyed mind-sets and replace them with positive, constructive attitudes. This should start at an early age so as to be more effective and easier to carry out.

Self-Worth

Self-worth on the one hand, coupled with acceptance on the other is one of the most imperative values that need to be addressed seriously and worked on at school. Hence, the learning environment needs to focus more on rewarding rather than punishing. This is a preliminary step towards creating a conducive environment for Culture of Peace. Self-worth can be attained by encouraging different points of view and uninhibited discussions in the classroom as well as acknowledging the fact that every student is entitled to an opinion, no matter how divergent it is from others' opinions. This would also contribute to developing other important values such as mutual respect and self-confidence. Teachers can also stress self-respect by involving the students in the course's outline and conception, which would not only boost their self-confidence but also imbue them with a sense of responsibility and give them a sense of purpose.

Class Arrangement

Deciding the students' seating arrangements is not solely for aesthetic purposes. Indeed, its effects far outweigh the eye-pleasing factor. The way students are seated in the learning environment; the way they are treated; and the way they are instructed are of the essence in determining the kind of persons they grow to be in the future. The classroom environment is actually a microcosm of the greater community. The more responsibility, trust, freedom of speech, democratic values, and mutual respect are nurtured in the classroom, the more it will be reflected on a wider community scale. Moreover, a class managed horizontally, i.e. in which the teacher does not order or direct students, but involves them in a two-way learning relationship, has proven fruitful. This does not mean a total hands-off approach to teaching, but rather that the teacher plays the role of mediator and facilitator of both the teaching process and the socialization process in class.

Problem-Solving

Dealing with conflicts in class, whether they arise amongst students themselves or between the students and the teacher should be handled in a way that fosters Culture of Peace values. As a matter of fact, it is essential to choose a particular course of action to nip crises in the bud especially because in class,

conflicts tend to transpire very often. Dealing with conflicts steadfastly actually enables students to acquire the much needed skill of peaceful problem-solving, which can then be put it into practice naturally in and outside of class. Instead of focusing on the problem itself, the teacher should underscore a constructive slant that leads automatically and spontaneously to finding a perfect solution. Methodically speaking, a teacher should first recognize the problem, opt for a specific strategy, and finally perform the reached resolution. If done accurately, this process is likely to teach students conflict resolution on their own, without even asking for a teacher to intervene.

Fighting the 'Isms'

Whether it is racism or sexism or any other "ism", deprecating or bigoted conflicts that stem from religion, race, or gender grounds must be dealt with seriously so that this kind of behaviour will not spread into the community. It is important to note that this type of hateful demeanour has been noticed at an early age. Hence, it should be remedied early on with the help of a culture of peace centred teaching. One way of combating discrimination is celebrating every chance of diversity in the classroom, be it ethnic, religious, racial, or national. Simultaneously, the Manuals should shed light on the common, universally acclaimed values that bring us together, and steer away from the traits that drive us apart. The same approach should be taken into consideration when dealing with students with special needs.

That being said, teaching Culture of Peace should go beyond manuals choices and extend its reach to the whole teaching method and the general learning atmosphere.

Higher Education Manuals:

General Introduction

Manuals aim

Since wars begin in the mind of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed (Preamble of UNESCO Constitution, 1945).

These words are at the origins of the mission and of the activities of the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO). The raison d'être of this Organization is a simple yet powerful idea: the conviction that, since "political and economic agreements of governments" are not enough for securing the support and the long-lasting commitment of the people of the world, peace must be founded on "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" (ibidem). After the Second World War and the scourges caused by the disputes among states, the UNESCO Constitution launched a revolutionary and still inspiring message to the world. It underlines that no change at global level and no permanent eradication of fear, violence and discrimination could be pursued without a permanent transformation of the individual's way of thinking and behaving in the broader social context.

Thanks to UNESCO, peace – far from being considered just as "absence of war" – became a framework of action to be introduced in people's lives in a holistic manner. Peace became synonymous of "culture of peace", namely "a collective and individual ethos animating spontaneous as well as reflexive behaviours conducive to tolerance, openness and dialogue" (UNESCO, 2013). The concept of "culture of peace" was officially adopted also within the broader UNESCO system. According to the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on September 1999 (A/RES/53/243), culture of peace is a set of "values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life" based on a wide array of individual and social dimensions, strongly coherent with the human rights para-

digm and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The "culture of peace" encompasses:

- respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation;

- full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

- full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;

- commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts;

- efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations;

- respect for and promotion of the right to development;

- respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men;

- respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information;

- adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations; and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace (Resolution A/RES/53/243, article 1).

Because of its aspiration to change values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life, the realization of a culture of peace implies a fundamental educational challenge, that of "enabling people at all levels to develop skills of dialogue and negotiation, consensus-building and peaceful resolution of differences" (ibidem). This is why – as recognized by the UN General Assembly – "education at all levels is one of the principal means to build a culture of peace […] and human rights education is of particular importance" (ibidem, article 4).

The "Culture of Peace Manuals", a four volumes series, promoted by the "Al-Babtain Cultural Foundation" should be seen as part of this educational path, started with the constitution of UNESCO in 1945, continued with the various initiatives promoted at international, regional and local level over the

years, and still alive in the work of people and institutions that are convinced that in a world buffeted by change and affected by violence, discrimination and intolerance, a stronger mobilisation is needed to build peace in the minds of men especially of young generations. Indeed, the aim of these four manuals, addressed to students of Bachelor's and Master's degrees is not only to contribute to the recognition of education and human rights education as core components of the "culture of peace", but also to stress the crucial role that culture of peace plays in a global reflection in which universal values are reinforced by cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. Taking into account all the above, this vocational aim stands high in tune with the UNESCO approach, at creating "intellectual unity" between the different parts of the world, building bridges of dialogue and cooperation with other cultures in order to "positively contribute to universal civilization" (ALESCO Constitution, 1970, article 1).

The educational approach to the promotion of the "culture of peace" should also be seen as an integral part of an action-oriented project linked with the objectives set by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on September 2015. Being an updated and more comprehensive version of the previous eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their related 169 targets represent a "new universal agenda" aimed at eradicating poverty and strengthening universal peace as a way for sustainable development, "leaving no one behind". Various principles have been put at the foundation of SDGs. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals are, first of all, about "people", since their objective is not only to end poverty and hunger in all their forms but also to ensure that all human beings can live in dignity and freedom. The SDGs are also about "planet" and "prosperity" because they aim at protecting and safeguarding the environment, at promoting the sustainable use of its resources and at guaranteeing to everybody the experience of a fulfilling life from an economic, social and environmental point of view. However, these Goals cannot be imagined as being separated from the realisation of "peace" since "there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development" (United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/70/1, p. 35). Only thanks to this, it would be possible to foster a "spirit of a strengthened global solidarity" that should guide the constitution of a global "partnership" for the realization of sustainable development.

Culture of peace and sustainable development are two sides of the same coin and, in the framework of these "Culture of Peace Manuals", they are treated in a synergic and mutually reinforcing manner. Both cultural of peace and sustainable development are holistic concepts: they consider material conditions – disarmament, poverty eradication, food security and nutrition – as inseparable from the establishment of peaceful and inclusive societies characterized by education opportunities, gender equality and the sustainable use of resources. Both culture of peace and sustainable development are human rights-based: they reaffirm the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of other human rights instruments, stressing the responsibility of all actors to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability or other status. Finally, both culture of peace and sustainable development include an educational challenge: they regard people – and especially children and young women and men – as "critical agents of change", as protagonists of the establishment of a "practiced peace" (UNESCO, 2013, p. 10), that connects universal principles with the real world and the daily life. The "Culture of Peace Manuals" fully endorse this empowering dimension: by promoting them, the "Al-Babtain Cultural Foundation" gives to students and people in general the necessary tools for translating peace and development into values, behaviours and actions that are relevant for their local context and rooted in a global understanding.

Manuals scope and methodology

The four "Culture of Peace Manuals" – 1) Peace and Human Rights; 2) Peace, Human Security and Human Development; 3) International and Local Democracy, Way of Peace; 4) Education and Culture for Peace and Human Rights – are imagined as up-to-date educational materials aimed at giving to Bachelor's and Master's Degree students a synthetic but comprehensive picture of the theoretical and practical linkages between the idea of the "culture of peace" and a wide array of other issues linked with the promotion and protection of human rights, international democracy and sustainable development. The methodological approach adopted within the four manuals can be defined as human-right based, multilevel, culturally relevant and action-oriented.

The Manuals are human-right based in the sense that they consider the international human rights principles and norms as the foundation of the "culture of peace". For this reason, the discussion of the different aspects that characterise "peace" are done in constant reference to the most important human rights Conventions and Declarations, to the work of the various international, regional, national and local organizations responsible for their implementation and to the practices and policies of human rights protection and promotion in various contexts. In the framework of this work, human rights are considered as the trait d'union of all international, regional, national and local initiatives for the realization of the "culture of peace". Being the rights that are inherent to all human beings whatever their nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status, human rights offer a fundamental conceptual lens for orienting the promotion of peace, democracy and sustainable development to the full realization of human dignity. By adopting a human right-based approach, these Manuals will be tools for students not only to increase their knowledge but also to develop their capabilities and to flourish as individuals freely, translating the "culture of peace" principles in responsible choices also in the daily life.

The methodological approach pursued is multilevel in the sense that these Manuals consider the protection and the promotion of human rights – as well as the connected realization of the "culture of peace" – as a mission that should be synergically pursued by different levels of governance, including international and regional organizations (such as United Nations, European Union, African Union and so on), states, but also local authorities, NGOs and civil society at large. According to the classic way of describing the human rights architecture, international human rights treaties establish obligations only on states. However, many globalized phenomena and global dynamics are less under the control of State's sovereignty and an increasing number of non-state actors have a considerable impact on the effective enjoyment of human rights. Hence, while recognizing the crucial role of national authorities in designing and implementing human rights interventions, the Manuals shed light also on the fundamental contribution that, in specific historical moments and also nowadays, local authorities, civil society organizations and individuals have given to the advancement of the "culture of peace", promoting grassroot initiatives that have inspired the international standard-setting and the work of international

organizations. This multilevel approach contributes at presenting the "culture of peace" as a shared mission that connects global and local actors, international principles and daily practices.

These four "Culture of Peace Manuals" are also intended to be culturally and professionally relevant. Their objective is, indeed, to discuss the protection and promotion of human rights, international democracy, peace and sustainable development with a particular focus on cultural specificities. By doing so, the Manuals try to be as much appropriate as possible: they discuss concepts and principles in a way that is pertinent and suitable to a given cultural modality or context, respectful of the culture and cultural rights of individuals and communities. This work also stresses the linkage between human rights, the culture of peace and cultural diversity. Considering cultural diversity as being embedded in the "uniqueness and pluralities" of humankind (UNESCO, 2001), the Manuals underline that the promotion of peace and human rights goes hand in hand with the valorisation of these diversities, in a way that promotes dialogue and mutual exchanges.

Finally, the methodological approach adopted is action-oriented in the sense that it aims at complementing theoretical and conceptual elements with practical ones, linked with programmes, policies and initiatives promoted at various levels in different parts of the world. This action-oriented approach is clear also looking at the structure of the four Manuals. In the books, each paragraph is complemented by one or more "insight boxes" containing additional materials such as international policy instruments, quotes from important historical figures, parts of research papers or best practices on the promotion of human rights and the "culture of peace". This is meant to be useful to foster students' curiosity and critical skills, stimulating them to look for further information and explanations also beyond the ones offered by these Manuals. The "insight boxes" are deemed to be essential to the educational challenge to which this work aims to respond, that of giving students not only knowledge about norms and principles but also instruments for making them able to translate the "culture of peace" into concrete and transformative practices.

1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The scientific sustainability of the traditional state-centred concept of security (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1959; Schelling 1966; Brodie 1973; Wight 1978) — understood as a state's capacity to protect its vital national interests with any means and in any part of the world — is thrown into doubt today by the development of irreversible processes of structural change in the international relations system. Such processes include planetary interdependence, economic globalization, trans-nationalization and the internationallization of human rights (Papisca, Mascia 2012).

The advancement of the mobile frontiers of international politics, together with the increase in inequality and imbalance caused by these processes, acts as a virus which lowers states' immune defences: that is, their capacity for governance. Interdependence, in particular, throws doubt on the pre-existing distribution and management of world power, and triggers processes of political de-territorialization, clearly affecting the inter-State identity of the international system.

The international political system is no longer identifiable merely as a community of states: that is, as a restricted set of sovereign territorial entities having international legal personality. Today, the system also includes many other actors, who have achieved an international status, such as international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental; trans-national social movements; local and regional authorities (Papisca 2009, 2010; Scholte 2011; Levi, Finizio, Vallinoto, 2014). Moreover, we must not forget that in virtue of the international legal recognition of human rights, individuals and peoples are the original subjects also in international law. The on-going structural changes produce and fuel a complexification of inter-active processes, creating greater possibilities for conflict. This directly affects the functionality and, indeed, the very structure of the entire system. To varying degrees, the increasing immune deficiency arising with planetary interdependence actually transforms all states into entities with limited sovereignty.

In this context, doubt is thrown on the premise that national security is by definition state security, involving the state's territorial integrity above all.

The concept of national security is in crisis for other reasons, as well. The distinction between the internal and the external is becoming more and more nuanced. Entities organized trans-nationally operate in several countries, independently of limits set by the typical dimensions of traditional international relations, statehood and territoriality. In addition, the international juridical recognition of human rights has spread citizens' human rights claims to a planetary level.

The social, political, economic and cultural realities within the various countries are directly exposed to a security risk, having immediately become sensitive toward one another and, on a more general level, directly related to variables pertaining to the international system as such. That is to say, the screens traditionally set up by countries in order to keep their domestic jurisdiction autonomous, are no longer viable. Since the environmental conditions of such internal situations differ deeply, the degree of countries' vulnerability also varies; so, therefore, does the degree of their interdependence, if not their dependence.

Threats have taken on a global character, a pervasive one transversal to nations.

In March 2005 the UN Secretary General Report on "In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005) gave an updated list, though not a complete one, of "new" threats to security: wars and conflicts between countries, internal conflicts, organized crime, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, nuclear), small weapons, genocide and other crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, poverty, contagious diseases, deterioration of the environment.

To this list, of course, we should add other factors which threaten security: in particular, the widespread, repeated violation of current international law by the waging of so-called "preventive" wars, and by related territorial occupation.

In the presence of global threats, the borders of security have expanded as well. More and more, countries' will and capacity are called on to make multilateral institutions function, and to build a world order based on respect for international law. The answer to the crucial issue of security cannot but be multidimensional and collective security, guaranteed by appropriate (democratic) multilateral institutions.

1.1 From national security to supranational collective security

The first attempt to tackle the problem of security with conceptual categories and tools different from the classic ones of state-centrism and from a supranational perspective dates back to the beginning of the last century. As it is known, the idea of a collective security system to guarantee international peace and security was widely debated during the First World War and took institutional shape in the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919).

Our attention is focused on the collective security system envisaged by the United Nations (UN) Charter, convinced that even today, almost 70 years after the San Francisco Conference, it maintains its validity intact.

The Charter provides for the establishment of a system aimed at providing the world organization with the necessary tools, including coercive ones, to maintain international peace and security. The starting point for understanding the ratio are the principles and objectives set out in the Charter.

The Preamble sets out the philosophy of positive peace and place within it, with the pertinent norms of the device, the constitutive and inalienable aims of the UN such as the proscription of the war, the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, the prohibition of the threat or use of strength in international relations, international justice, respect for human rights, equality of rights and self-determination of peoples. These are all novel principles that the UN Charter places for the first time in the history of international treaties as the foundation of the world order.

More nuanced is instead the reference to the state-centric principles, such as the sovereign equality of the states, contradicted by the Charter itself when it attributes to the five great powers a permanent seat on the Security Council and a power of veto, and that of the interference in internal affairs. Also in this case, the exception provided for by art. 2.7 strengthens the supranational competence and power of the UN:

"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII".

The provisions of art. 4.1 of the Charter particularly underline the universalist and pacifying vision of the World Organization, at the limit of utopia: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations" (italics added).

The collective security drawn by the Charter is that of a multilateral institution created by the states with the task of maintaining peace in the international system and with the constraint for states to renounce war as a means of resolving international disputes (except in cases of self-defence to following armed attack).

It is within this framework aimed at building a positive peace order, one should read Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter dedicated respectively to "Pacific settlement of disputes", "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression", "Regional arrangements" .

Chapter VI of the Charter contains a detailed list of the peaceful means that parties to a dispute should carry out: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice (art. 33).

If at this stage the resolution of the dispute is not achieved, the coercive measures envisaged by Chapter VII of the Charter can be triggered. According to art. 41

"the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations".

If these measures have proved to be inadequate too, the Security Council, pursuant to Article 42 "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations".

The letter of this article does not legitimize the UN to undertake war actions, since this would be in conflict with the typology of military operations indicated in art. 42 (demonstrations, blocks, etc.), and with the letter and the spirit of the Charter, which is clearly of positive peace. Art. 42, instead, obliges effective demonstrative military police actions, undertaken on the grounds of both dissuasion and interposition between the contenders and, more generally, of imposition and maintenance of international public order.

In order for the UN to act in this way, two conditions must exist: a) the agreement of the 5 permanent members of the Council (therefore no veto); b) the availability of military forces under direct UN authority (be careful: in the case of the United Nations, the authority is supranational, not multinational).

These forces can only come from the member states of the Organization according to the provisions of Article 43. The plans for the use of the United Nations security force are established by the Security Council, which makes use of a Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of the Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council and, on certain occasions and at the express invitation of the Committee, from those of other UN member states.

But Article 42 has not been implemented until now because Article 43 has not yet been implemented. Art. 43 reads:

"1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. (…).

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members, (…)".

The meaning of this article is obvious: if states do not permanently make available to the UN part of their armed forces, the Security Council cannot take actions that involve the use of force for the purposes and according to the principles set out in the Charter.

On the other hand, the same authors of the Charter, foreseeing the resistance of the states in implementing the agreements established by the art. 43,

have inserted a "Transitional security arrangements" (art. 106), still in force today, which throws light on the ambiguities that characterize the action of the UN in the field of security:

> *"Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security" (art. 106).*

Therefore, as far as the security system is concerned, we are still in a "transitional" regime that leaves the five permanent members of the Security Council a power to act outside and above the Charter itself. It is a provision that, over 70 years after the Charter has entered into force, cannot but be defined as scandalous, incompatible with the new international law.

Finally, Chapter VIII of the Charter authorises the Security Council to use, if necessary, "the agreements and regional organizations for coercive actions under its direction" and establishes that such actions cannot be undertaken without the authorization of the Security Council (art. 53).

It should be emphasized that the principle of prohibiting the use of force is partially contradicted by the possibility of individual and collective self-defence, in response to armed aggression, which article 51 of the Charter allows exceptionally and temporally limited to states.

The United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) with his Report "An Agenda for Peace", prepared in a period of perceived need to re-launch the UN system, makes the first important change towards a wider operational mandate for the United Nations, removing the ideological and strategic barrier to the UN intervention that had characterized the period of the cold war.

Boutros-Ghali, precisely with reference to Chapter VII of the Charter, supports the thesis that the UN must do what the UN Charter requires it to do, in opposition to the thesis that the UN should do what it is allowed to do by the strongest states. He wanted to put the governments in front of their responsibilities. We quote from the Report:

"Use of military force. 43. Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security.

This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis. Under the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the Charter was adopted, the longstanding obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail.

The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response. Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order. I recommend that the Security Council initiate negotiations in accordance with Article 43, supported by the Military Staff Committee, which may be augmented if necessary by others in accordance with Article 47, paragraph 2, of the Charter".

The provision of national armed forces to the UN in a permanent way would speed up the process of transition from national security to collective security. Such a decision would trigger a process of real disarmament by bringing under control of the United Nations both the production and trade of weapons. Moreover, it would favour the establishment of military contingents (adequately trained for international military police tasks) of rapid use, so that the United Nations can promptly dispose of them in the field (stand-by units).

A significant contribution by the UN to the achievement of international peace and human security has been increasingly represented by the deployment of peacekeeping operations since 1948. Generally speaking, these operations involve the use of lightly armed multilateral forces (the so-called "Blue Helmets") provided on a voluntary basis by UN member states with the aim of separating previously warring parties and increasingly contributing to advance

institution building, the rule of law and human rights. Peacekeeping operations must be authorised by the Security Council, which also sets their mandate and the peacekeepers' rules of engagement. The Department of Peace Operations provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. All peacekeeping operations are based on three inter-related and mutually-reinforcing core principles: impartiality; consents of the parties; and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate (see also Insight Box 1, below).

Insight Box 1 - UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East

Since the creation of peace-keeping, the UN Department for Peace Operations has led and coordinated a total of 71 operations across the globe aimed at, among other objectives, protecting civilians, preventing conflicts, building the rule of law and security institutions in situations of post-conflict and promoting human rights, also through efforts to implement the agenda "women, peace and security" (S/RES/1325, 2000). 14 of these operations are currently ongoing. Three of them, among the oldest UN peacekeeping missions, are deployed in the Middle East region.

UNTSO

Set up in May 1948, UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) was the first ever peacekeeping operation established by the United Nations. Since then, UNTSO military observers have remained in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfil their respective mandates. UNTSO personnel have also been available at short notice to form the nucleus of some other peacekeeping operations worldwide. The ability of UNTSO's military observers to deploy almost immediately after the Security Council has authorized a new mission, has been a significant factor in the success of those operations.

UNDOF

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established on 31 May 1974 by Security Council resolution 350 (1974), following

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the agreed disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between the Israeli and Syrian forces and to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement. During the Syrian conflict started in 2011, however, there were violations of the ceasefire with the escalation of military activity in the area of separation patrolled by UNDOF peacekeepers. On June 29, 2017, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2361 (2017) renewing UNDOF's mandate and strongly condemned the use of heavy weapons by the Syrian armed forces and armed groups in the area of separation.

UNIFIL

Originally, UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) was created by the Security Council in March 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area. Following the July/August 2006 crisis between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Security Council enhanced this Force (generally referred to as UNIFIL II) and decided that in addition to the original mandate, UNIFIL would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.

Source: UN Department of Peace Operations

(https://peacekeeping.un.org/en).

Insight Box 2 - The UNESCO Blue Helmets for Culture and the protection of cultural heritage during conflicts

The necessity of safeguarding cultural heritage in crisis and conflict areas has always been at the heart of UNESCO's mission. However, this topic received an increasing attention since April 2015, after the systematic attacks that were perpetrated by groups of religious extremists against cultural heritage. These recent attacks against millenary sites have shocked and awoken the international community for several reasons: they were accompanied by a targeted and widespread communication strategy on social media; they were rational, methodical and rigorously planned and they spoke out loud about a will un-

leashed with the very purpose of erasing the symbols of other cultures' history and tradition, as well as whole populations.

In the light of this, the UNESCO 38th General Conference of Paris, 3–18 November 2015, passed a resolution to establish – adopting an effective slogan often used by both media and diplomats – the 'Blue Helmets for Culture'. Building on the positive experience of the 'United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali' (MINUSMA), which was mandated to ensure the safeguarding of cultural heritage sites in collaboration with UNESCO, the resolution adopts a new strategy founded on two key elements: 1) the inclusion of a cultural component in the mandates of peacekeeping interventions where cultural heritage is at risk; 2) the creation of a task force of experts in the protection of cultural heritage.

As a direct contribution to the actualization of the resolution, UNESCO and the Italian Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 16 February 2016 in Rome for the establishment of the first task force. Named 'Unite4Heritage', the task force is largely based on the Italian Carabinieri 'Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage' (Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale), which is internationally renowned as of the most competent and effective military policing force for protecting works of art and archaeological property. The Director-General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, urged other countries to establish and make available similarly specialized units to strengthen and enforce the existing cultural heritage protection regime, expressing her confidence that "this Task Force, and the agreement signed in Rome with the Italian Government, will become a model for other countries". The urgency of the issue was also recently taken up by the UN Security Council, which approved Resolution 2437 on 24 March 2017, providing for the engagement of a cultural component in UN peace-keeping missions.

The 'Blue Helmets for Culture' entered into force after the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between UNESCO and Italian Government but are currently non-operative. According to the Memorandum, prior to its official launching, an operation agreement needs to spell out how the taskforce will operate on the ground. For the moment, the Italian task force was successfully established and tested in the earthquake-stricken areas of central Italy, securing thousands of works of art.

1.2 The multidimensionality of security

In the 1970s and 80s, attention grew regarding topics linked to economic and social security. The tendency has been to expand the human dimension of the concept of international peace and security, making it embrace economic well-being, democracy, development, human rights, and basic needs such as education, health, food, and housing.

Ullman (1983) and Buzan (1983) were forerunners of this expanded security concept. In the early 1980s, they brought up the issue of multi-dimensionality, proposing a profound revision of research topics regarding security. With the end of the bipolar era, the debate evolved along two main lines (Krause, Williams 1996): a "vertical" one focusing on the variety of subjects to whom the security concept may refer, including both sub-national and supra-national subjects, and a "horizontal" line aiming to extend analysis according to the different functions of various security sectors and issues. In this regard, the "School of Copenhagen" distinguishes between five fundamental dimensions of security: military, political, economic, social and environmental (Buzan 1998).

The horizontal line of the security debate is progressing by way of UN practices, as they have evolved under the impact of challenges linked to the international recognition of human rights, to demands for development, and to demands for protection of the natural environment.

Remember that as early as 1970, the General Assembly had adopted the "Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" (United Nations 1970), whose contents attest to evolution in an approach which has progressively abandoned its military-national focus to adopt an economic-social-international collective one.

Insight Box 3 – Excerpts from the "Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" (A/RES/2734(XXV))

The General Assembly,

19. Affirms its belief that there is a close connexion between the strengthening of international security, disarmament and the economic development of countries, so that any progress made towards any of these objectives will constitute progress towards all of them;

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21. Emphatically reiterates the need to undertake, within the framework of the Second United Nations Development Decade, urgent and concerted international action based on a global strategy aimed at reducing and eliminating as soon as possible the economic gap between developed and developing countries, which is closely and essentially correlated to the strengthening of the security of all nations and the establishment of lasting international peace;

22. Solemnly reaffirms that universal respect for and full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedom and the elimination of the violation of those rights are urgent and essential to the strengthening of international security, and hence resolutely condemns all forms of oppression, tyranny and discrimination, particularly racism and racial discrimination, where-ever they occur.

It is useful to recall that in 1986, a year after Michail Gorbachev came on stage, and under his direct inspiration, the foreign ministers of ten socialist countries of Eastern Europe presented the General Assembly with a document entitled "Preparing a general system of international security" (United Nations 1986), requesting that it be adopted by a formal resolution. The document is actually a summa of international security, conceived in light of the structural changes in progress (a "complex world, full of contradictions but interdependent") which demand "a new approach to the problems of world security" and the "restructuring of international relations based on cooperation and concertation", as well as the "democratization of international relations". The "new" security "is indivisible and cannot help but be universal and equal for all"; it therefore requires a "general system of international security embracing not only the political and military sectors, but also the economic and humanitarian". In the present circumstances, it states, "no state, however powerful, can hope to defend itself solely by military means". The document was not adopted, above all because NATO member countries rejected it.

The interrelation between security, disarmament and economic development is well expressed in art. 7 of the UN Declaration on the right to development (1986):

"All States should promote the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security and, to that end, should do their utmost to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as to ensure that the resources released by effective disarmament measures are used for comprehensive development, in particular that of the developing countries".

It is significant remember that the Declaration was passed by 146 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions (against: United States; abstaining: Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom).

In this regard, we should recall the crucial statement in the concluding document of the Summit meeting of the Security Council, in 1992. It reads: "the absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security" (United Nations 1992, 3). We should also recall the Report "An Agenda for Peace", which the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, prepared on explicit mandate from the Security Council. It discusses a "new dimension of security" which must lead the UN to act with greater determination in order to defeat poverty, disease, famine, drought and oppression.

The UN General Assembly with the Resolution 55/2 on "United Nations Millennium Declaration" definitively establishes that

> *"We consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. These include: (…) Responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally. As the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role".*

The new, multi-dimensional concept of security is currently finding growing acceptance, as well, among regional organizations of Europe, Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Arab world.

1.3 The human security approach of the United Nations

Careful consideration shows that, substantially, the idea of "human security" (HS) already exists in the Charter of the United Nations. The results, both in terms of codifying International Human Rights Law (standard setting) and in terms of promoting institutions and policies for the furthering and protec-

tion of human rights (machinery), make up the humus in which HS has found systematic expression. We must again stress that with the UN Charter, for the first time in the history of international treaties, the declaration of state-centred principles is accompanied —indeed, limited — by a recognition of new principles in the international system: those referring to the centrality of the human person, which we mentioned earlier.

The very Preamble to the Charter opens, not with the traditional formula, "the High Contracting Parties" or "the States Parties to the present Convention", but with "We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war […], to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women".

In the form of a binding legal instrument, the UN Charter means to signal a radical breakage with the international order of state sovereignties established in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, and to open up new, human-centred horizons in the life of all peoples. In this context of exemplary innovation, the most fertile source is surely the International Code of Human Rights. It contains not only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the two Covenants of 1966, concerning, respectively, civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights; it also contains more than 130 international legal instruments, some of which apply universally and some regionally. Note that among the general principles of this new International Law, we find the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, along with other international legal instruments in the field, refer to security as a human right. Recognizing the human person as the central subject of referral for the new international law, these instruments constitute the "normative foundation" for human security. In this respect, article 3 of the Universal Declaration is emblematic. It states that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person". In other words, everything regarding human security has been progressively included in the norms of International Human Rights Law; and these norms have trans-

lated human security needs into corresponding juridical obligations for states. In short, human security cannot help but be defined according to the principle of the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights; our capacity for dealing with it must be intimately linked to the effectiveness of international law and, of course, to the political will of states.

The philosophical strategy of HS is deeply rooted in this new international law. The political consequences are necessarily momentous. The philosophy is organized on a bedrock foundation made up of an organic set of norms and principles which are legally binding for states, international organizations, non-governmental associations, and single individuals. In this form, it helps to reinforce the operative dimension of all knowledge concerning human rights, in light of their recognized interdependence and indivisibility; and it can evolve only within a collective UN security system: an inclusive system, operating by statutory mandate.

Within the UN framework, the first organically coherent reflection concerning HS arose from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In its fifth annual Report on human development, we find the very definition of "human security" (UNDP 1994, 23-24; Newman, Oliver 2001; Owen 2008; MacFarlane, Yuen Foong-Khong 2004):

"It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development. [...] The list of threats to human security is long, but most can be considered under seven main categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security".

This definition clearly points to a fundamental goal: that of widening a concept which has long been interpreted in a reductive way, and always in reference to the exclusively national sphere: "as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust" (UNDP 1994, 32).

UNDP identifies four fundamental HS characteristics. The first is universality, in reference both to geographic extension—it regards both rich and poor nations—and to types of threat, which affect all peoples, though with varying degrees of severity: unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations. The second is interdependence, even in a spatial sense, among the various components of HS. When the security of persons and of communities is in danger in a country or in a region of the world, persons living in other countries and in other regions may be exposed to the same dangers, though with varying degrees of vulnerability. The above-mentioned threats to security are no longer isolated events emerging within the borders of a state; their extension and impact is global. The third characteristic touches on "how" to pursue HS objectives. The UNDP Report stresses that early prevention is the main tool, even based on a mere calculation of cost / benefit. The fourth characteristic is the centrality of the person: "human security" is committed to satisfying the vital needs / fundamental rights of persons and peoples, which are economic-social-cultural, on one hand, and civil-political, on the other (UNDP 1994, 23-24).

UNDP links "human security" to "human development", viewing them as distinct, and yet interdependent and indivisible: as will be further elaborated in Chapter 3 below, human development is defined "as a process of widening the range of people's choices", while human security implies "that people can exercise these choices safely and freely" (UNDP 1994, 23).

The most recent attempt to give top priority, on the political agenda of the international community, to the issue of international peace and security in the new light of human security, was made by the Commission on Human Security, established in 2001 by initiative of the Japanese government and according to a proposal by the UN Secretary General. The Commission of independent experts completed the task in May 2003 by presenting the Report, Human Security Now (Commission on Human Security 2003).

The document contains the systematic arrangement of an HS approach based on "putting people first". Security among states and national security

are necessary, according to the Commission, but not sufficient for achieving people's security. Threats against it are not always classifiable as threats against state security. Similarly, the vital interests of a State often fail to coincide with the vital interests of persons and communities. In the words of the Report, the philosophy elaborated by the Commission could be summed up in this way: "from the security of borders to the lives of people and communities inside and across those borders".

The meaning and importance of HS are thus expressed in the Report:

"to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity" (Ibidem, 12).

What the Commission elaborated conceptually hinges on the two ideas, "protection and empowerment": protection requires the enactment of institutions, norms, policies and mechanisms capable of responding to the dangers menacing the lives of persons; empowerment, instead, means a process fostering the development of individuals' potential so that they can actively participate in choices regarding the community.

The same line of reasoning finds expression in the document issued by the 2005 UN World Summit and approved by the General Assembly gathered at the level of state and government leaders from 14 to 16 September on the 60th anniversary of the UN (United Nations 2005). The document reaffirms "the vital importance of an effective multilateral system, in accordance with international law"; the crucial importance of the UN in promoting peace, security, development and human rights, considered as "the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being". It again stresses the commitment

"to work towards a security consensus based on the recognition that many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, security and human rights are mutually reinforcing, that no State can best protect itself by acting entirely alone and that all States need an effective and efficient collective security system pursuant to the purposes and principles of the Charter […] to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity […], to discuss and define the notion of human security in the General Assembly".

Only three years later, on 22 May 2008, the General Assembly of the United Nations responded to the request by the World Summit by activating informal debate on human security. From it emerged "a broad consensus on the need for a new culture of international relations that goes beyond fragmented responses and calls for coherent, integrated, and people-centred solutions" (United Nations 2010). The member states recognize the "added value" of the human security concept uniting the three pillars of the United Nations system—security, development and human rights—and favours more effective coordination among member states, international organizations and the civil society. The debate also produced common perspectives for intervention in various areas touching on human security, but it did not produce a common definition.

The first formal debate was organized by the President of the General Assembly on 20 and 21 May 2010, in which different views on the notion of human security were presented by Member States, including on the report of the Secretary-General (A/64/701). With resolution 64/291 of the 16 July 2010 the General Assembly recognised ongoing efforts to define the notion of human security, and noted the need to continue the discussion and achieve an agreement on the definition of human security.

The second informal thematic debate on human security was convened on 14 April 2011 by the President of the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session. While the need for continued consultation was emphasized, inputs by Member States nevertheless confirmed the emergence of a level of consensus by which the notion of human security could be framed. The Report of the Secretary General reads: "In particular, Member States understood the notion

of human security to encompass a people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented framework through which national capacities could be strengthened. In addition, a number of Member States saw the added value of human security in compelling policymakers and practitioners to focus on the real needs and the multidimensional insecurities facing people today. As a result, a number of Member States considered that human security provided an important lens through which the United Nations can better address the interface between security, development and human rights in its activities" (United Nations 2012).

A common understanding of human security was agreed by the General Assembly on 2012 (United Nations 2012). The Resolution saw the General Assembly agree that the human security approach identifies and addresses widespread and interrelated challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people.

Insight Box 4 – The General Assembly Agreement on Human Security

The General Assembly,

(…) 3. Agrees that human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. Based on this, a common understanding on the notion of human security includes the following:

(a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential;

(b) Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities;

(c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;

(d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation;

(e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security;

(f) Human security is based on national ownership. Since the political, economic, social and cultural conditions for human security vary significantly across and within countries, and at different points in time, human security strengthens national solutions which are compatible with local realities;

(g) Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their request, so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society;

(h) Human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Human security does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States" (…).

Source: United Nations 2012.

2. THE REGIONAL SECURITY SPACE

2.1 The role of the European Union

A plurality of organised systems operate in the area of European security, making our continent a "highly institutionalised security complex" (Alvaro 2011, 18). They include the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union (EU). As for such a defence plurality, in no other region of the world are there examples comparable to the European experience.

Clearly, this "highly institutionalised security complex" in Europe requires efficient politico-institutional and operational coordination if we want to keep the European security space from breaking up into fragments. Just as clearly, however, this coordination depends on many factors: the statutory mandate proper to each country; the operational space; the diversity of national or regional interests at stake; the political will of the stronger states; the diversity among governance systems; the level of internal democratisation; the differing financial capacity.

Needless to underline that NATO and the CSTO are political-military alliances aiming to ensure the collective defence of its members: an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all. The statutes of both these organisations refer explicitly to the principles and goals of the United Nations Charter, and recognise the central role of the Security Council in peace-keeping and international security. The CSTO was founded in 2002 and it is based on the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992 (Treaty of Tashkent). CSTO Member States are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

On its part, immediately after the fall of the two blocs, OSCE has proven active in the area of institution-building in central and eastern Europe, in human rights monitoring, and in electoral observation. OSCE has been less effective in the area of security, in particular in conflict prevention and stopping wars. OSCE's problems are tied to three main factors: first, OSCE's members include the United States and Canada, whose interests are clearly divergent form those of Europe; second, for security in Europe, the best equipped organisation is

NATO, in expansion eastward; third, in the area of human rights, there exists another European organisation, the Council of Europe, with consolidated, effective experience. Given this situation, we can see why despite the important work it has done in monitoring the progress of democracy in Europe, OSCE has been unable to repeat the success of its predecessor, the CSCE. For OSCE, then, now that the walls have fallen, the big problem is not efficacy, but identity, and the division of political labour with other European institutions.

On its part, the EU has progressively brought forward a Common security and defence policy (CSDP) in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a sort of landing-place which the EU has been forced to reach due to a variety of factors, including the end of the Cold War and the need to fill the existing gap between ambitions and reality (Hill 1993, 1998; Ginsberg 1999; Howorth 2007), foster its "soft power", protect its power of attraction, and respond to the request for Europe which continues to come from every corner of the globe. In short, we have been witnessing a political development of integration indispensable for asserting with greater credibility and efficacy, Europe's role as global actor, not only in the economic sector, but also in that of peace and international security (Bendiek, Kramer 2010; Attinà, Irrera, 2010).

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that the EU must act in accordance with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, universality and indivisibility of human rights, respect for human dignity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law and promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular within the United Nations (art. 21.1). A constant reference to these principles is contained in the declarations and agreements that the EU signs with third countries and regional groups, as well as in CFSP decisions.

The EU is committed to developing the capacities necessary for enacting the Missions of Petersberg: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (see art. 43 TEU). In addition, a "mutual assistance clause" quite similar to the one contained in article V of the NATO Treaty is foreseen for all EU Member States as well.

At present the CSDP is regulated by provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon (Mérand 2008; Missiroli 2010). Article 24 establishes that the CFSP encompasses "all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence". Concerning the CSDP, article 42, par. 1 specifies:

"The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States".

Special treatment is reserved by art. 42, par. 2, for the Member States of NATO:

"The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework".

The NATO question re-emerges in the last paragraph of art. 42:

"Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation".

The Treaty of Lisbon further states that it is the task of the European Council to decide on these issues, by unanimous vote: that is to say, all or nothing; but it presents a window which in the near future might open significant new opportunities for development in the CSDP: "permanent structured cooperation".

To more than 15 years after the establishment of the CSDP, the EU has its own civil-military institutional apparatus which strives to guarantee greater cohesion and efficacy for Europe, as well as increasing operative flexibility (Grevi, Helly, Keohane 2009). The problem remains of managing a system where di-

visions persist among the Member States, along with political ambiguities and interference in the area of inter-institutional relations.

To overcome these divisions and to define its unitary position in the international political system, the EU has adopted two security strategies.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted by the European Council in 2003 and updated in 2008. It aims to meet the challenges of our post-bipolar era, marked by strong interdependence, in which threats to security not only multiply, but are more diversified in content, requiring new means for pursuing security. We cannot objectively assess the new security concept elaborated by the EU if we refer only to parameters and conceptual categories pertaining to an obstinately State-centred vision of the international system.

The most outstanding new element regarding the ESS, is its pertinence to the human security philosophy and to the legal-institutional framework of the UN and international law, considered as "the fundamental framework for international relations". Multilateral organisations are considered the most suitable system of governance for meeting global security threats.

It is no mere coincidence that analysis of the global context, and thus, the collective dimension of security, evolves after starting out from an international-regional level of high political importance, such as the process of European integration. This has already "transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens". With the progressive spread of principles respecting democracy, the community of law and respect for human rights, integration has favoured the transformation of authoritarian regimes into "secure, stable and dynamic democracies" (European Council 2003, 2).

Through the ESS, the EU has clearly intended to stress the winning potential of its model for integration, and for the promotion of multilateralism and universal human values, unlike those states — the superpowers, above all — which in recent decades have opted for a unilateralist, openly war-generating strategy.

Another distinctly innovative factor is that ESS puts the accent not so much on the military capacities of the EU, as on its global role in contributing toward "better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures", and through creating "confidence building and arms control

regimes" (Ibidem, 11). This, precisely, is the EU's approach to "preventive engagement". The use of "military instruments and means" is explicitly foreseen only in the presence of situations caused by so-called "failed states", in order "to restore order", and in the phase following a regional conflict (Ibidem, 8). It is perfectly clear, therefore, that a context permitting the use of the military is one of "crisis management" or of post-conflict reconstruction, and that any preventive type of action must be of an essentially non-military nature (Duke 2004, 474).

The transatlantic relationship and NATO, as an "important expression of this relationship", are named as "core elements of the international system". The ESS document ends by reiterating the "irreplaceable" nature of transatlantic relations: "Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world".

The ESS had been strongly criticised, especially by America. The greatest weakness of the ESS, critics said, lie in the fact that it avoids mentioning the use of military means in pursuing political ends. Though it presents a serious analysis of threats facing the EU, the ESS is rather vague as to how to deal with those threats; it is vague in indicating the EU's role in international security; and it fails to answer the fundamental question: how should EU Member States guarantee their security and that of their citizens? (Bereuter 2004, 21). Further criticism against the ESS's strategic value starts out by noting that the EU document fails to satisfy traditional "strategy paper" criteria, which should define concrete objectives and establish priorities in achieving them; and indicate what means can be used, and under what conditions, in order to reach the defined goals (Schmidt, Geipel 2004, 32). Critics have also stated that "it is difficult for the EU to develop a grand strategy, though it needs one even more urgently than a single nation would" (Posen 2004, 33).

Again, in variation on the theme: critics object that the ESS "is not a recipe"(Ibidem, 34), but a transitory document, important in that it marks a beginning in the development of a new conception concerning Europe's collective strategic interests and the elements necessary to pursuing them (Ibidem, 38).

Five years after adoption of the ESS, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy presented before the Council of the European

Union the "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World" (Council of the European Union 2008). From the start, the Report makes clear that the global approach adopted by the ESS in 2003 has demonstrated its full validity, and that "this Report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it" (Ibidem, 3). The document examines the progress made, and indicates steps which the EU should take towards improving enactment of the ESS.

In the area of global challenges and fundamental threats, the Report points out that those identified by the ESS not only have failed to disappear, but "some have become more significant, and all more complex" (Ibidem, 3). However, the order of priority for the challenges has changed, and new challenges are added. Terrorism no longer heads the list, but occupies second place together with organised crime; the number-one threat is now the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. After these threats come three "new" ones, so to speak, in the sense that they were not included in the ESS list: cybercrime, energy dependence and the climate change. The Report dedicates special attention to the so-called "frozen conflicts" in eastern countries (Georgia, where the EU maintains a civil mission), and to the Middle East, where the EU is committed both politically, within the "Quartet", and on the ground, with two police missions in the occupied Palestine Territories and at the Rafah pass; and it focuses on the situation in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. The EU has sent a police mission to Afghanistan, while in Somalia the first maritime mission is operating within the CSDP framework in order to combat acts of piracy along the Somali coast.

The Report's chapter dedicated to actions aiming to create stability within and outside Europe demonstrates that the enlargement policy constitutes "a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform" (Ibidem, 6). The Report therefore emphasises the bond between international security and development as a priority in promoting stability: "there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Threats to public health, particularly pandemics, further undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation" (Ibidem, 8).

The Report contains two highly significant footholds for effective enactment of the human security concept, which had been lacking in the 2003 ESS.

The first concerns the role of non-state actors operating for humanitarian purposes: "Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners" (Ibidem, 9). The second touches on the theme of human rights, and the role of women in security policies and common defence: "We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The EU has recognised the role of women in building peace. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context" (Ibidem, 10).

Finally, the document of the High Representative raises the issue of "representation in international institutions", emphasising that "legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral form made more efficient". The reform process of the United Nations system must continue, maintaining the prime responsibility of the Security Council in international peace-keeping and security. Activity by the International Criminal Court must be supported, and EU action in promoting justice and human rights on the international level must be reinforced.

In short, the Report tends toward illustrating and specifying European security strategy in reference to the human security paradigm, with ever-increasing conviction and concreteness (Mascia 2011).

What is certain is that with its ESS, the EU had preceded by several years, a security policy that we might call "de-territorialised" and "de-nationalised", in which the use of military force is used not in order to expand influence and power, in the traditional geopolitical meaning of those terms, but mainly in order to pursue human security goals (Matlary 2006, 108). The problem of "capabilities" as an element essential to a culture of strategy, is linked primarily to political capabilities operating in the key of supranational governance; military capabilities stand on a lower plane.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in June 2016 updated the EU security vision with a new document entitled "Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" (EU HR/VP 2016; Howorth 2016; Tocci 2016; Missiroli 2015).

The global strategy is in the wake of the previous one. Critical issues are addressed, such as the fight against terrorism, cyber-security, energy security, enlargement and neighbourhood policies, migration policy, sustainable development, conflict prevention and resolution, and cooperation with other regional organizations.

The ethical-legal paradigm of reference for the external action of the EU is that of internationally recognized human rights. The EU is committed to acting globally "to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights" (EU HR/VP 2016, 17), to promote "the responsibility to protect, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law", to support "the UN Human Rights Council and encourage the widest acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice" (Ibidem, 42). The EU also undertakes to "systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions" (Ibidem, 51) and to refine "the tools to protect and empower civic actors, notably human rights defenders, sustaining a vibrant civil society worldwide" (Ibidem, 43).

The vision is that of a global multidimensional security with the United Nations and international law at its heart. The EU "will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core. (…) Through our combined weight, we can promote agreed rules to contain power politics and contribute to a peaceful, fair and prosperous world. (…) "A multilateral order grounded in international law, including the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is the only guarantee for peace and security at home and abroad. A rules-based global order unlocks the full potential of a prosperous Union with open economies and deep global connections, and embeds democratic values within the international system" (Ibidem, 16).

In the chapter on Global Governance for the 21th Century it is reiterated that

"the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, which ensure peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons. (…) The EU will strive for

a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors. (…) A commitment to global governance must translate in the determination to reform the UN, including the Security Council, and the International Financial Institutions. Resisting change risks triggering the erosion of such institutions and the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of all EU Member States" (Ibidem, 39).

On the subject of security and defence in the EU Global Strategy it is emphasized that "NATO exists to defend its members – most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. (...) When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. (…) In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO" (Ibidem, 20).

In short, the EU approach to the CFSP/CSDP that begins to take organic form, at least in the documents even if not yet, completely, in fact, is a global approach (aims to overcome the traditional concept of national security), legalistic (founded on international law), multidimensional (security is economic, social, environmental, as well as international public order), democratic (enhances the participation of non-state actors in the decision-making processes of international institutions), multilateralist (favours the role of multilateral organizations starting with the UN with respect to bilateral cooperation), therefore an approach of "human security" and "people security".

The EU approach to security should be considered in light of the European Union's natural vocation as global actor: in the original version, as a civilian power (Zielonka 2011; Ferreira Nunes, 2011; Faleg 2017); and as such, the bearer of "soft power". This concept, defined by J.S. Nye (2005, 5) as "the capacity to obtain what is wanted through attraction rather than coercion", is appropriate in describing the EU's mode of action in the international political system. As emphasised by J.S. Nye (Ibidem, 11), the "soft power" of a country

depends primarily on three resources: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policy. In the case of the EU, the main resources of power stem to a great degree from the universal values expressed through its culture, its institutions, its policies, and the way in which it handles its relations with other actors.

Some people stress that in order to maintain its "soft power" and protect its "attractive power" from the danger of erosion, the EU needs a balanced combination of "soft power" and "hard power", and that the time has come for the EU to implement a "grand strategy" (Howorth 2009, 39), carefully calibrating the relation between means and grand ends (Biscop, Howorth, Giegerich 2009). We might speak, here, of "reinforced soft power".

It is appropriate here to note that although the military criterion inherently lies outside the concept of "soft power" as "civilian power", the EU is by nature obliged to encompass that criterion in its soft-power vocation.

The way to do this would be to conceive and use a reinforced soft power, "teleologically" reconverting the EU's military capabilities in order to make it more and more functional to the objectives which must characterise international policing missions, within the new, multidimensional paradigm of human security. For the EU, this operation would not be impossible, either in principle or in practise.

The EU dialogue on security, in fact, lies fully within the line of thought which makes constant referral to the international human rights law, and to the centrality of the supra-national authority of the United Nations. What is still missing is an EU document formally stating the requisites, objectives and operative modes for peace-keeping with military means, as distinct from traditional military operations; in connection with both types of operation, the same terminology (e.g. "battlegroups") may allude to war, in varying degrees of explicitness.

We must attempt to establish an appropriate division of labour, starting from the assumption that NATO's identity is one typical of a military alliance, whereas the EU's identity is that of an organisation dedicated to security and crisis management, humanitarian assistance, human development, promotion of human rights, environmental protection, international commerce, etc. It is by setting out from this identitary distinction that we should develop a political

line of reasoning, taking precedence over a military one, on roles and labour division between these two actors in the international security system.

The EU does not need to create its own autonomous apparatus for collective defence, in short, a "European army". However, this perspective does not currently appear on the agenda of European leaders, and even less, of the European civil society. NATO is destined to remain for quite some time, the principle expression of Atlantic solidarity and, as such, the "guarantor of European security" (de Vasconcelos 2009, 154). We must also emphasise that the EU's military mission is essentially oriented outward, ad extra, with goals and content proper to United Nations peace-keeping. This naturally means that the CSDP must have available military resources able to carry out autonomous peace enforcement missions. These are already envisioned in descriptions of the "Petersberg Missions", which include a wide range of intervention, but whose further delay might sound an alarm bell warning that the EU is drifting toward traditional types of military operations. In the CSDP sphere, the EU should continue to do what it has done over the years, committing itself to making its presence ever more visible in the framework of international law and of UN Security Council decisions. To this end it should accelerate the "Europeanisation" process of the national military and civilian capabilities, in order to put them permanently at the service of UN peace-keeping missions, pursuant of the aforementioned art. 43 of the UN Charter.

Insight Box 5 - EU peacekeeping missions in North Africa and the Middle East

Over the years, the European Union has deployed 34 missions/operations in Europe, Asia and Africa as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The objectives of these missions, which can have either a military or civilian or both dimensions include keeping peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, combating trafficking in human beings. In 2019, 16 of these operations are ongoing. 6 of them are military operations, 10 are of civilian nature. 4 of these are deployed in North Africa and the Middle East.

EUBAM Rafah

The European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point – EUBAM Rafah – was launched on 24 November 2005, to monitor the operations of the border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, after Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access on 15 November 2005. The Council of the European Union welcomed the Agreement and approved that the EU should undertake the third-party role proposed.

The operational phase of the mission began on 30 November 2005. The Rafah Crossing Point was last opened with the presence of EUBAM monitors on 9 June 2007. A total of nearly 450 000 passengers used the crossing before that date, with an average of about 1 500 people a day. Since then, the mission has remained on standby, awaiting a political solution and ready to re-engage at very short notice.

The regular opening of the Rafah Crossing Point is a vital issue for any future agreements concerning the Gaza Strip. Under the 2005 Agreements, the EU third-party presence takes into account Israel's security concerns and ensures the freedom of movement of the 1,5 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip.

EUAM Iraq

The European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM Iraq) was launched in October 2017 in response to a request by the Iraqi government for advice on how to undertake civilian security sector reform (SSR). The Mission had an initial mandate of one year, which, based on an assessment of Iraqi needs and progress made, has been extended until April 2020. This combined needs/ progress assessment also resulted in a substantial growth of the Mission, almost doubling its authorised personnel number from 50 to 95.

EUAM Iraq is providing expertise on a diverse range of reform components, such as policy design, human rights, organised crime, security legislation and human resource management.

These reform efforts form part of a wide-ranging undertaking guided by Iraq's Security Sector Reform Programme and contribute to the implementation of the National Security Strategy, which aims to build state institutions capable of consolidating stabilisation gains, driving development and preventing the renewal of conflict. Several partners are supporting Iraq in

this multifaceted, strategic process, and the Mission works closely with other contributors to help generate synergies and avoid overlaps between our respective efforts.

EUBAM Libya

The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) was established in 2013 in response to an invitation by Libya and is part of the EU's comprehensive approach to support the transition to a democratic, stable and prosperous Libya.

EUBAM Libya supports the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security at the country's land, sea and air borders; it assists Libyan authorities at strategic and operational level. The work is carried out through advising, training and mentoring Libyan counterparts in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices, and by advising the Libyan authorities on the development of a national Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy.

At the strategic level EUBAM has helped the Libyan authorities to set up a cross-ministerial body to coordinate the response among naval, police, border guards, customs, and all the other agencies involved. The content of EUBAM Libya training, advising and mentoring activities have covered all areas of IBM, such as intra and inter-agency cooperation, risk management methods, optimal use of existing equipment and restructuring of agencies to increase effectiveness.

Training and advice have been delivered to hundreds of Libyan border management officials on aviation security, customs best practices, vehicle and passport checks, risk analysis, international and inter-agency cooperation and maritime search and rescue, among other topics.

Due to the political and security situation in Libya, EUBAM has been operating from Tunisia since August 2014. Because of the limited possibilities to advise, mentor and train its Libyan counterparts, EUBAM Libya was downsized to 17 international mission members on 14 October. With this limited capacity, the Mission has continued to support the Libyan Customs and Naval Coast Guard through workshops and seminars organised outside Libya.

EUPOL COPPS (occupied Palestinian territory)

EUPOL COPPS (EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support), established on 1 January 2006, is the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the occupied Palestinian territory. Initially the Mission was established as a Police Mission comprising a Police Advisory Section. In 2008 a Rule of Law Section was added. EUPOL COPPS, mainly through these two sections, assists the Palestinian Authority in building its institutions, for a future Palestinian state, focused on security and justice sector reforms. This is effected under Palestinian ownership and in accordance with the best European and international standards. Ultimately the Mission's objective is to improve the safety and security of the Palestinian people.

The Mission forms part of the wider EU effort to support Palestinian state building, in the context of working towards a comprehensive peace, based on a two-State solution.

EUPOL COPPS is fully dedicated to the inclusion of human rights as well as a gender perspective and gender-mainstreaming standards in all of its activities, both within the Mission and while working with our Palestinian counterparts.

Its tasks include to support the Palestinian Civil Police reform and development; to strengthen and support the Criminal Justice System; to improve Prosecution-Police interaction; to coordinate and facilitate external donor assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police.

Source: European External Action Service (https://eeas.europa.eu/).

The provisions contained in the Treaty of Lisbon indicate the direction in which the CFSP/CSDP should evolve. In particular, I refer to the most significant new element, "permanent structured cooperation" (Biscop 2008; Hougardy 2008; Biscop, Coelmont 2011). Article 42.6 of the Lisbon Treaty establishes that "Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework".

Protocol 10 on permanent structured cooperation recognises that the UN "may request the Union's assistance for the urgent implementation of missions

undertaken under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter". In doing so, it states that such cooperation is of an inclusive nature, in the sense that it is open to each member State committed to developing its defence capability in order to become capable of undertaking the Petersberg Missions mentioned in TEU article 43.

In short, we may legitimately hypothesise that permanent structured co-operations may well become the channel by which we "Europeanise" the civil and military capabilities of Member States, endowing the EU with that "supra-national power" necessary for speaking in a single voice, within the world political system.

2.2 The role of the African Union and of the League of Arab States

The African Union (AU) has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, which was adopted in July 2002, in Durban, and entered into force in December 2003, outlines the various components of the APSA and their respective responsibilities. Other documents were subsequently adopted to facilitate and expedite the operationalization of the APSA.

The APSA embraces a comprehensive agenda for peace and security in Africa that includes: early warning and conflict prevention; peace-making, peace support operations, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development; promotion of democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights; and humanitarian action and disaster management.

The main pillar of the APSA is the PSC, which is supported, in the discharge of its mandate, by various structures, namely: the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.

The Peace and Security Council is the African Union's standing decision-making body responsible for the maintenance of continental peace and security. It has 15 members, elected by the AU Executive Council on regional basis (three from Central Africa; three from East Africa; two from North Africa; three from Southern Africa; and four from West Africa).

The Panel of the Wise (PoW) is one of the critical pillars of the APSA. The panel consists of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent with a task to support the efforts of the PSC particularly in the area of conflict prevention.

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is one of the pillars of the APSA. It is responsible for data collection and analysis and is mandated to collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and Nongovernmental Organizations. It advises the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommends the best courses of action.

The African Standby Force (ASF) is composed of multidimensional capabilities, including military, police and civilian, on standby in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment. The range of functions assigned to the ASF includes: observation and monitoring missions; peace support operations; intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state to restore peace and security; preventive deployment to prevent a dispute or a conflict; peace building, including post conflict disarmament and demobilization; Humanitarian assistance.

Within the APSA, the Peace and Security Department has launched the Gender, Peace and Security Programme (2015-2020) which aims at developing effective strategies for gender mainstreaming into Peace and Security to take into account men's and women's experiences and potentialities in building secure and stable societies. The Programme contributes towards gender mainstreaming, debate and policy development in the field of women, gender, peace and security and in so-doing enhances the dialogue around women's effective participation in peace and security in Africa, protection in time of conflict and recognition in the post-conflict phase.

The relationship between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) is a key APSA component. Interaction between the PSC and other AU organs, such as the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as with civil society organizations, is equally vital for the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. Furthermore, the PSC Protocol provides for partnerships between the AU, on the one hand, the United Nations and other relevant international stakeholders, on the other hand.

The League of Arab States (or Arab League), a regional international organisation founded in 1945 to strengthening the relations between its member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between them and safeguarding their independence and sovereignty is increasingly attracting the attention of the international community for the possible contribution it is bringing as a regional actor to peace and international security.

In this specific context, it is worth highlighting the efforts to create an institution specifically devoted to reach this goal. As reported, "in 2006 the Arab League sought to emulate the reforms successfully introduced by the African Union by adopting measures to establish an Arab Peace and Security Council intended to prevent, manage, and resolve regional conflicts. These reforms would have established the Arab League as the primary forum for the settlement of disputes and theoretically represented a step toward greater institutionalization of its conflict prevention, management, and resolution mechanisms. The Arab Peace and Security Council, which Arab League officials saw as a potential complement to the League's traditional reliance on the offices of the secretary general, was formally established in 2008. The Arab Peace and Security Council remains advisory in function, and as such, its recommendations are subject to Arab League Council approval (Hanna 2018).

Despite the slow progress in establishing an ad hoc machinery, over the years, the Arab League took significant initiatives contributing regionally to advance global peace and human security. A couple of them are illustrated below.

Among these initiatives, it is worth mentioning the Saudi-proposed Arab peace initiative a seven-point plan for an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict adopted by the Arab League at the 2002 summit of Beirut and then reinstated during 2007 and 2017 summits. The initiative calls for normalizing relations between the Arab region and Israel, in exchange for a full withdrawal by Israel from the occupied territories (including East Jerusalem) and a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee problem based on UN Resolution 194 and the acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Although substantially neglected by Israeli politicians, the Arab peace initiative is a global reference for those attempting to achieve a just peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians and, together with the 2003 Road Map for peace of the Quartet for the Middle East, is systematically recalled in all UN Security Council resolutions concerning the situation in the Palestinian territories (see for instance, Resolution 2334 (2016)).

Another interesting development concerns the development and adoption in 2012 by the General Secretariat of the Arab League with the Arab Women Organization and UN Women, of the Arab Regional Strategy "Protecting Arab Women: Peace and Security". The Strategy is grounded in international and regional human rights and humanitarian law, especially those that relate specifically to peace and security. It approaches the issue of security from the perspective of human security and focuses on the obligations to protect women from all forms of gender-based violence during times of peace and conflict, as well as the enjoyment of all her rights without discrimination. The Strategy makes clear reference to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its pillars (participation, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery), as well as related subsequent Security Council Resolutions (Merwati 2015).

3. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

3.1 The work of UNDP for promoting human development

3.1.1 The UNDP's mission and main activities

The international reflections and initiatives on the advancement of human security and human development have been at the centre of the mission and work of United Nations specialized agency: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As noticed by Murphy (2006, 4), UNDP's history is significant because, more than other specialized agencies, this Programme "has retained the commitment and the hope that international cooperation and between the developed and the developing world will foster lasting peace". UNDP can be defined as a "the UN's global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life" (UNDP 2014). Its mission was, since the beginning, "to confront poverty, give a voice to the voiceless, and to begin to reverse the growing global economic and political gaps" (Murphy 2006, 5).

UNDP was founded in 1966 and resulted from the combination of two predecessor organizations: the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) and the United Nations Special Fund. The EPTA provided "technical assistance" to less privileged nations, giving to them knowledge and support useful for activating development processes; the United Nations Special Fund, instead, performed surveys and investment analysis to help identify large, economically feasible development projects, providing countries the necessary economic resources for realizing them. The UNDP reunited and reinforced the development efforts of the two agencies and, as affirmed by the UN Secretary General, it put the United Nations on the "front-line of a global war on want".

Since its foundation, the UNDP aimed at achieving development that is sustainable, inclusive and resilient by acting on three fronts: a) poverty reduction and sustainable development, b) democratic governance and peace-building and c) climate and disaster resilience. For what concerns poverty reduction and sustainable development, UNDP's mandate focused on combining economic growth with the creation of benefits and opportunities for poor and marginalized groups and the respect for environment. As part of this effort, UNDP has

become a trusted development partner, and co-sponsor of UNAIDS, helping countries put HIV/AIDS at the centre of national development and poverty reduction strategies, working to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and reduce its impact. UNDP has also helped build national capacity to mobilize all levels of government and civil society for a coordinated and effective response to the epidemic and protect the rights of people living with AIDS, women, and vulnerable populations.

Regarding democratic governance and peace-building, UNDP concentrated on making democratic systems inclusive and accountable, able to meet expectations for participation, services and security. This agency has helped countries strengthen their electoral and legislative systems, improve access to justice and public administration, and develop a greater capacity to deliver basic services to those most in need.

As far as the climate and disaster resilience is concerned, UNDP assisted countries and communities in systematically identifying and preventing big risks to development, helping them with quick recovery and greater resilience to crisis. The Agency has provided support in dealing with global issues such as climate change, loss of biodiversity and ozone layer depletion, helping national authorities strengthen their capacity to address these challenges at global, national and community levels.

The UNDP engagement in these domains takes place through three levels of action: a) the UN Country Programme for all United Nations agencies in a country, b) the UNDP Country Programme for a single country and c) the specific UNDP Programmes.

Through the UN Country Programmes, the UNDP coordinates the efforts of all United Nations agencies in addressing the developing needs of a specific country. On the basis of a careful analysis of country's situation - the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA), the UNDP proposes, together with other concerned agencies, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This Framework is a strategic, medium term results scheme that describes the collective vision and response of the UN system to national development priorities and results on the basis of normative programming principles. It describes how UN Country Teams will contribute to the achievement of

development results based on a common country analysis and a joint mission that reflects the priorities set at the UN level.

On the basis of the UNDAF, the UNDP formulates the UNDP Country Programme, describing more in detail how the objectives set in the framework will be realized in practice on the ground. The UNDP Country Programme defines a number of specific targets and its approved every year by the UNDP Executive Board. In addition to and consistently with this Programme, the UNDP formulates a Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), an operational master plan that refines the approach taken by the UNDP Country Programme and guides the development and delivery of projects on an annual basis. The Action Plan details the programme, the major results expected and the strategies for achieving these results, clarifying the arrangements for project implementation and the management of the projects.

The UNDP projects represent the concrete outputs of the Action Plan, translating in practice the objectives set in the planning document. A UNDP project is managed according to a well-structured sequence of phases and procedures. For what concerns the proposal, the project idea should be in line with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the UNDP Country Programme, contributing to the results expected from UNDP's operations in the current programme period and effectively responding to the country's development needs. The definition of a project' scope and objectives takes place through the approval of the UNDP Project Appraisal Committee (PAC) who assures that results are clear and attainable in a cost-effective way. For what concerns the realisation, the UNDP projects follow an Annual Work Plan (AWP) in which all project's outputs are detailed together with a proposed deadline of implementation of all the activities. At the end of a project, a particular attention is put on the elaboration of an evaluation report, in which the results of the intervention should be clearly described in terms of outputs, outcomes and impacts. The outputs are the tangible, time-bound products, goods and services that result from development interventions while the outcomes are intended as the short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs, also linked with changes in people's perceptions and behaviours. Impacts are defined, instead, as the actual and intended changes in human development as measured in people's wellbeing, representing the concrete improvement in people's lives.

The UNDP - actually active in more than 170 countries - has realized development projects in the various regions of the world. For what concerns Africa, one could mention the plans to end poverty in Niger, through which this organization has backed a national development plan reinforcing the actions and the funds dedicated to irrigated agriculture and reduced malnutrition. In Asia and the Pacific, the UNDP worked for the recovery of the Philippines, after the storm Typhoon Haiyan, helping national authorities in restoring essential infrastructure, livelihoods and public services as well as in designing preventing initiatives such as disaster risk and response mechanisms. In Central Asia, UNDP backed Kazakhstan in promoting a transition towards green economy, supporting a nascent wind energy industry and encouraging efforts to green transformation and buildings. Thanks to the UNDP project, energy efficiency is now central in the National Programme on the Modernization of Housing and Municipal Infrastructure. For what concerns Latin America, UNDP has realized various projects in El Salvador for combating violence through the fight against poverty and social fragmentation. Thanks to UNDP assistance, the Government has adopted its first policy on justice and peaceful coexistence investing in crime statistics, regulatory laws for the use of guns and job programmes dedicated to at-risk youth. Regarding Arab States, UNDP has played a crucial role during the 2014 passage of Tunisia's Constitution, which was soon recognised as a landmark of human rights protection. In this context, UNDP promoted actions for making the Constitution process as inclusive as possible, organizing meetings with citizens and training for civil society organizations.

In designing and implementing its projects, the UNDP follow a well-defined series of principles and approaches. First, UNDP interventions are based on full national ownership, recognizing that governments have the primary responsibility for the development of their countries and for establishing and leading the national development agenda. Secondly, UNDP assumes that development, peace, security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Moreover, UNDP considers South-South cooperation as one of the most important pillars of its work. The objective of this type of cooperation is that of making developing countries work together to find solutions to common development strategies. Finally, UNDP engages for promoting gender equality and women's empowerment in its main areas of activity, stressing that those human rights are at the heart of human development processes.

3.1.2 The UNDP's engagement for human development

Being more than a provider of technical assistance for the developing countries, UNDP has played a fundamental role in bringing international cooperation and development at the centre of the United Nations system. Thanks to the UN and UNDP Country Programmes and the specific UNDP programmes, this agency has provided the "most extensive and most consistent presence of the entire UN system throughout the world" (Murphy 2006, 7), nurturing the creation of new organizations with specific roles to play in the process of global development.

Above all, UNDP has been a source of new information and ideas about development, being at the forefront of the formulation and operationalization of the concepts of "human development" and "development as freedom". Strongly inspired by Amartya Sen's "capabilities approach" (see Insight Box 6), UNDP launched in 1990 its first Human Development Report, containing the official definition of "human development" adopted by the United Nations system, its measurement through the Human Development Index and the analysis of the experience of 14 countries in managing economic growth and human development.

Insight Box 6 - Core concepts and structure of Sen's capabilities approach

Functionings and capabilities

When evaluating well-being, Sen argues, the most important thing is to consider what people are actually able to be and do. The commodities or wealth people have or their mental reactions (utility) are an inappropriate focus because they provide only limited or indirect information about how well a life is going. Resources are considered as an input, but their value depends upon individuals' ability to convert them into valuable functionings, which depends, for example, on their personal physiology (such as health), social norms, and physical environment (such as road quality). Sen illustrates his point with the example of a standard bicycle. This has the characteristics of "transportation" but whether it will actually provide transportation will depend on the characteristics of those who try to use it. It might be considered a generally useful tool for most people to extend their mobility, but it obvi-

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ously will not do that for a person without legs. Even if that person, by some quirk, finds the bicycle delightful, we should nevertheless be able to note within our evaluative system that she still lacks transportation. Nor does this mental reaction show that the same person would not appreciate transportation if it were really available to her.

The capability approach focuses directly on the quality of life that individuals are actually able to achieve. This quality of life is analysed in terms of the core concepts of "functionings" and "capability".

"Functionings" are states of "being and doing" such as being well-nourished, having shelter. They should be distinguished from the commodities employed to achieve them (as "bicycling" is distinguishable from "possessing a bike");

"Capability" refers to the set of valuable functionings that a person has effective access to. Thus, a person's capability represents the effective freedom of an individual to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that she has reason to value. In later work, Sen refers to "capabilities" in the plural (or even "freedoms") instead of a single capability set, and this is also common in the wider capability literature. This allows analysis to focus on sets of functionings related to particular aspects of life, for example, the capabilities of literacy, health, or political freedom.

[…]

Evaluation: What capability do people have to live a good life?

Assessing capability is more demanding than other accounts of advantage since it not only takes a much broader view of what well-being achievement consists in but also tries to assess the freedom people actually have to choose high quality options. Because the value of a capability set represents a person's effective freedom to live a valuable life in terms of the value of the functionings available to that individual, when the available functionings are improved, so is the person's effective freedom.

The capability approach in principle allows a very wide range of dimensions of advantage to be positively evaluated ("what capabilities does this person have?"). This allows an open diagnostic approach to what is going well or badly in people's lives that can be used to reveal unexpected shortfalls or successes in different dimensions, without aggregating them all together into one

number. The informational focus can be tightened depending on the purpose of the evaluation exercise and relevant valuational and informational constraints. For example, if the approach is limited to considering "basic capabilities" then the assessment is limited to a narrower range of dimensions and attempts to assess deprivation – the shortfall from the minimal thresholds of those capabilities –, which will exclude evaluation of how well the lives of those above the threshold are going.

[…] The capability approach takes a multi-dimensional approach to evaluation. Often it may seem that people are generally well-off, yet a closer analysis reveals that this "all-things-considered" judgement conceals surprising shortfalls in particular capabilities, for example, the sporting icon who can't read. Capability analysis rejects the presumption that unusual achievement in some dimensions compensates for shortfalls in others. From a justice perspective, the capability approach relevance here is to argue that if people are falling short on a particular capability that has been collectively agreed to be a significant one, then justice would require addressing the shortfall itself if at all possible, rather than offering compensation in some other form, such as increased income.

Capability evaluation is demanding and its precision is limited by the level of agreement about which functionings are valuable. However, Sen has shown that even where only elementary evaluation of quite basic capabilities is possible (for example, life-expectancy or literacy outcomes), this can still provide much more, and more relevant, action-guiding information than the standard alternatives. In particular, by making perspicuous contrasts between successes and failures the capability approach can direct political and public attention to neglected dimensions of human well-being. For example, countries with similar levels of wealth can have dramatically different levels of aggregate achievement - and inequality - on such non-controversially important dimensions as longevity and literacy. And, vice versa, countries with very small economies can sometimes score as highly on these dimensions as the richest. This demonstrates both the limitations of relying exclusively on economic metrics for evaluating development, and the fact that national wealth does not pose a rigid constraint on such achievements.

Source: The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (https://www.iep.utm.edu/sen-cap/).

Contrary to the "development as growth" and the "development as efficiency" approaches, focusing on the need for the disadvantaged to have opportunities to earn incomes and/or become equal to those in the developed world, "human development" or "development as freedom" aim at ensuring for each person the ability - the freedom - to pursue individual and collective goals (see Insight Box 7). In the UNDP Human Development Report 1999, human development is defined as "process of enlarging people's choices" and especially those that are essential for people to "lead a a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living". It is conceptualized as having a twofold component, including a) the formation of human capabilities - such as improved health, knowledge and skills - and b) the use people make of their acquired capabilities - for leisure, productive purposes or being active in cultural, social and political affairs. In this sense, it encompasses "both the process of widening people's choices and the level of their achieved well-being" (UNDP 1990, 10).

Insight Box 7 - The definition of "human development"

Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and change over time. But at all levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. If these essential choices are not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible. But human development does not end there. Additional choices, highly valued by many people, range from political, economic and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive, and enjoying personal self-respect and guaranteed human rights. Human development has two sides: the formation of human capabilities such as improved health, knowledge and skills - and the use people make of their acquired capabilities - for leisure, productive purposes or being active in cultural, social and political affairs. If the scales of human development do not finely balance the two sides, considerable human frustration may result.

According to this concept of human development, income is clearly only one option that people would like to have, albeit an important one. But it is not the sum total of their lives. Development must, therefore, be more than just the expansion of income and wealth. Its focus must be people.


The innovative character of the concept of human development lies in the different importance attributed to the GNP. At the basis of the first Human Development Report in 1990, there was the conviction that "income is a means and not an end [...]" and that the "well-being of a society depends on the uses to which income is put, not on the level of income itself" (UNDP 1990, 11). The crucial point is that of considering GNP growth as being necessary but not sufficient for human development, stressing that human progress may be lacking in some societies despite rapid GNP growth or high per capita income levels unless some additional steps are taken. The reflection on human development and the necessity of overcoming the excessive preoccupation with GNP are closely connected with the development experiences of the 90s. Indeed, many fast-growing developing countries discovered that their high GNP growth rates failed to reduce the socioeconomic deprivation of substantial sections of their population. Consistently, even industrial nations discovered that high income is not a protection against the rapid spread of such problems as drugs, alcoholism, AIDS, homelessness, violence and the breakdown of family relations. At the same time, some low-income countries demonstrated that it is possible to achieve high levels of human development if they skilfully use the available means to expand basic capabilities.

In the light of these considerations, UNDP promoted "human development" as a holistic and more comprehensive idea, trying to differentiate it also from other existing approaches to development, such as a) the human resources, b) the human welfare and c) the basic needs approaches. While all these approaches focus on a) human beings as means of the development process, b) as beneficiaries rather than as participants and c) on the type of goods and services that they need, "human development brings together the production and distribution of commodities and the expansion and use of human capabilities" (ibidem). Moreover, it is concerned not only with basic need satisfaction but also with making the process participatory and dynamic.

Far from being connected only with GNP, the UNDP report suggested that the measurement of human development should be focused on three essential elements of human life: 1) longevity, 2) knowledge and 3) decent living standards. These three dimensions are the constituents of the Human Development Index - HDI (see Insight Box 8).

Insight Box 8 - The Human Development Index (HDI)

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.

The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean.

Human Development Index (HDI)					
DIMENSIONS	Long and healthy life	Knowledge		A decent standard of living	
INDICATORS	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (PPP $)	
DIMENSION INDEX	Life expectancy index	Education index		GNI index	

Human Development Index (HDI)

For what concerns longevity, this is measured looking at life expectancy at birth. Life expectancy is considered an important indicator of human development, not only because it is valuable per se but also because other indirect benefits, such as adequate nutrition and good health, are closely associated with it.

Regarding knowledge and education, this is evaluated looking at people's level of literacy. Even if literacy only partially reflects access to education and the quality of education, it is considered as a first step in a person's learning and knowledge building.

The third component - decent living standards - can be considered as the most difficult to be measured, due to its multifaceted nature. While data on access to land, credit, income and other resources would be needed, it focuses on a income indicator, considered as being able to reflect, even partially, the command over resources needed for a decent living.

The HDI constitutes a powerful tool for formulating a ranking between countries as far as the basic dimension of the human development are concerned, including but not just focusing on GNP. Being a simple summary index, UNDP has soon recognized that the HDI simplifies and captures only part of what the complexity of human development entails and that further measures should be included to grasp also the dimensions linked with inequalities, poverty, human security and empowerment. For this reason, in the most recent analyses, the results obtained through the calculus of HDI have been integrated with some other indexes, such as the Inequality-adjusted HDI, the Gender Development Index and the Gender Inequality Index.

The Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) combines a country's average achievements in health, education and income with how those achievements are distributed among country's population in order to take into account the cost of inequality, namely the loss to human development due to unequal distributions. The IHDI allows a direct link to inequalities in dimensions, it can inform policies towards inequality reduction, and leads to better understanding of inequalities across population and their contribution to the overall human development cost.

The Gender Development Index (GDI) measures gender gaps in human development achievements by accounting for disparities between women and men in three basic dimensions of human development—health, knowledge and living standards using the same component indicators as in the HDI. This Index shows how much women are lagging behind their male counterparts and how much women need to catch up within each dimension of human development.

While the GDI focuses on gender inequalities regarding the basic dimensions of human development, the Gender Inequality Index (GII) measures inequalities as far as other aspects of the well-being are concerned: a) reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates, b) empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education, and c) economic status, expressed as labour market participation and measured by labour force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older. This Index highlights areas in need of critical policy intervention and stimulates proactive thinking and public policy to overcome systematic disadvantages of women.

3.1.3 The Arab Human Development Report 2016

Since 1990, UNDP publishes annually a Human Development Report with a statistical update of the countries' ranking as far as the Human Development Index (HDI) is concerned. Apart from reporting and analyzing data on a global level, some UNDP reports focus also on specific regions. In 2016, an updated Arab Human Development Report was released, endeavouring to uncover the challenges facing the region, analyzing the social, political and economic trends that influence the region and contributing to guiding the debates on crucial issues with the aim of advancing the development process.

The focus of the 2016 Arab Report is youth and, more specifically, the necessity of empowering younger generations as a means to achieve human development in the broader sense. The main idea is that youth empowerment is not only an urgent priority in its own right but also a prerequisite for achieving tangible and sustainable progress on development and stability for the entire region. That proposal is based on a twofold argument. First, investing in youth empowerment is seen as a way for responding to the "demographic momentum", namely to the fact that, as never happened in the previous decades, Arab population is extremely young. Indeed, while young people between the ages of 15 and 29 make up nearly a third of the region's population, another third are below the age of 15. Secondly, youth empowerment is considered as way to manage in a productive way the social transformation brought about by the wave of protests of 2011. The protests, that have seen a great involvement of young people, have also shown that their well-being and active involvement in society is essential for laying new and more durable foundations for stability.

Starting from the assumption that youth empowerment entails "the expansion in young people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them" (Kabeer 1999), the Arab report provides a careful analysis of the factors that hinder younger generations' well-being and active engagement, preventing "the full unleashing of their inherent energy" (UNDP 2016, 23). First, the report underlines the scant suitable job opportunities provided to young people in the Arab countries. This aspect is considered as one of the biggest and most urgent challenges of the whole region. The report stresses that the average rate of participation of youth in the workforce is low, at around 24% and falling to less than 18% among young

women. Meanwhile, the youth unemployment rate is among the highest in the world, reaching almost 30% (World Bank 2015). Because of this, many young people with high educational qualifications must wait for long periods to find good jobs. "There is no doubt that the inability to find suitable jobs was a major fuel of the instability afflicting the region over the last few years, as well as a fundamental reason for the growing phenomenon of immigration among young people in search of better conditions" (UNDP 2016, 25).

The Arab report evidences also a weak political participation of young people in the Arab countries, underling that the levels of both voting turnout and civic engagement through associations are among the lowest in the world. Indeed, while the interest of young people in political participation is rising compared to older-age groups, this interest rarely translates into active participation, except among more well-educated young people. This also due to "the nature of political life in Arab countries, which is generally exclusionary" (UNDP 2016, 27). In addition to that, the report stresses that, while national efforts have succeeded in raising completion rates in basic education and in improving health care and average life expectancy, the quality of social services decreases during conflicts and in the poorest areas of the Arab countries. In general, youth empowerment is diminished by social disparities and persisting discriminations for specific demographic groups. The report stresses that gender equality is still far to be achieved in the Arab world. "Women suffer from gender inequality in most Arab countries, and they pay a double price in disempowerment if they are also young. [...] Rights of marriage and divorce are unequal among men and women, and women remain considerably more vulnerable to domestic and institutional violence". Specifically, the report underlines that the expanding opportunities available to young women to acquire suitable education over the past few decades have not been accompanied by equally significant change in the labour market, preventing them from playing an active role in society. Finally, the report underlines that many development efforts and improvements realized towards reaching a proper youth empowerment are strongly diminished by the prolonged conflicts in the Arab region.

According to the Arab Human Development Report, the empowerment of the youth requires the adoption of a new development model that, as reported

in Figure 1, allows the younger generations to both enhance their capabilities and expand their opportunities. First, the Report underlines the necessity of enhancing the basic capabilities of young people to allow them to realize their full potential. The focus is on achieving a decent standard of living, through the provision of housing services and social security, and on promoting fair and inclusive access to education and quality health services. Secondly, the Report stresses the importance of widening the opportunities available to young people for self-fulfilment by providing suitable job opportunities, respecting their political and social rights and freedoms, enabling them to participate actively in government and public institutions and holding these accountable, and tackling all forms of discrimination based on identity or gender. According to the Report, every policy should be designed and implemented within an "enabling environment" based on peace and security as fundamental preconditions to guarantee the feasibility and sustainability of the first two strategic objectives.

Figure 1 - Suggested features of a new development model focused on youth

3.2 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Between 6-8 September 2000, the international community gathered at the United Nations headquarters in New York in the context of the "Millennium Summit", whose main outcome document, unanimously adopted, was the "Millennium Declaration", a statement of values, principles and objectives for the international agenda for the twenty-first century. In the Millennium Declaration, world leaders agreed in considering a number of fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century, including freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility. In addition, the world leaders who gathered at this Summit committed their nations to a global partnership to reduce extreme poverty, and set out a series of time-bound targets, to be reached by the end of 2015. These targets have become known as the 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):

1) **eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;**

2) **achieve universal primary education;**

3) **promote gender equality and empower women;**

4) **reduce child mortality;**

5) **improve maternal health;**

6) **combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;**

7) **ensure environmental sustainability;**

8) **develop a global partnership for development.**

As Fukuda-Parr (2013, 181) recognises, the "MDGs have been unprecedented in the high level of policy commitment that they have mobilized and in forging a consensus on defining a common purpose for development and expressed in simple terms, without theory, what development means and why it is important".

However, as far as the implementation of these ambitious goals is concerned, fifteen years after their adoption, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 recognised that in spite of the significant achievements made across the globe on some of the 21 targets into which the MDGs had been specified, progress was uneven across regions and countries, leaving significant gaps and millions of people behind, especially the poorest and those

disadvantaged because of their sex, age, disability, ethnicity or geographic location (UN 2015).

In particular, the main shortcomings identified in the report concerning the implementation of the MDGs agenda were that a) gender inequality persisted; b) big gaps continued to existed between the poorest and richest households, and between rural and urban areas; c) climate change and environmental degradation was undermining the progress achieved, and poor people were suffering the most from this; d) conflicts remained the biggest threat to human development; and e) millions of poor people were still living in poverty and hunger, without access to basic services. Fifteen years after the launch, in other words, the MDGs agenda had some success, but proved to be overall ineffective to tackle the complex, multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral challenges that truly human-centred development processes face globally in this era.

Learning from the limits and errors made in the definition, implementation and outcomes of the MDGs framework, many of which, as will be elaborated in section 3.3. below, revolved around the very limited integration between development commitments and human rights standards, the international community worked intensely to set up a new, more ambitious and inclusive global strategy of action for the promotion of human-centred development.

The resulting commitment of this process is commonly known today as the "Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development", or as the "5Ps Agenda" due to the fact that its definition and implementation are expected to stimulate global action in favour of People and the Planet, fostering Prosperity and Peace and strengthening Partnership as indicated in the Preamble of the General Assembly resolution 70/01 that adopted the 2030 Agenda (see Insight Box 9).

Insight Box 9 - The 5 Ps in the Preamble of 2030 Agenda (A/RES/70/1)

The General Assembly

Adopts the following outcome document of the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda:

Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Preamble

This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. It also seeks to strengthen universal peace in larger freedom. We recognize that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the

---

greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development.

All countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan. We are resolved to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet. We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world on to a sustainable and resilient path. As we embark on this collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind.

The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets which we are announcing today demonstrate the scale and ambition of this new universal Agenda. They seek to build on the Millennium Development Goals and complete what they did not achieve. They seek to realize the human rights of all and to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental.

The Goals and targets will stimulate action over the next 15 years in areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet.

People

We are determined to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions, and to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment.

Planet

We are determined to protect the planet from degradation, including through sustainable consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural resources and taking urgent action on climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations.

Prosperity

We are determined to ensure that all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives and that economic, social and technological progress occurs in harmony with nature.

Peace

We are determined to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence. There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.

> Partnership
>
> We are determined to mobilize the means required to implement this Agenda through a revitalized Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people.
>
> The interlinkages and integrated nature of the Sustainable Development Goals are of crucial importance in ensuring that the purpose of the new Agenda is realized. If we realize our ambitions across the full extent of the Agenda, the lives of all will be profoundly improved and our world will be transformed for the better.

In the planned effort to reach these ambitious and multi-dimensional achievements the international community has agreed to commit itself to the advance 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were specified into 169 targets which include both outcome targets and targets concerning the means of implementation. The 17 SDGs which will guide the global development effort until 2030 are the following:

Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere;

Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture;

Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages;

Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all;

Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls;

Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all;

Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all;

Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation;

Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries;

Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns;

Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts;

Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development;

Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss;

Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels;

Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development.

UN Member States adopted this post-2015 Development Agenda during the UN Sustainable Development Summit, which took place in New York from September 25-27. The outcome of this Summit was the result of both the work made by a 30-member Open Working Group set up in 2013 by the UN General Assembly to develop a proposal on the SDGs and, following up on their work, of the negotiation process begun by the General Assembly in January 2015 on the post-2015 development agenda.

The 2030 Agenda and its SDGs sensibly differ from the MDGs framework on several grounds. One certainly concerns the level of definition of the international community's development goals, outcome targets and means of implementation. As already shown, the previous development framework set by the Millennium Declaration was developed over 8 goals and 21 targets, while the outcome document of this summit sets a total of 17 SDGs with 169 targets, covering a wide range of issues to address the increasingly complex development-related challenges that the world is facing today.

The differences, however, go far beyond the numbers and definition of development objectives and targets. In fact, the 2030 Agenda represents a real change of paradigm in the way of approaching development by the international community as it can be seen already from the very first phase of this

process, concerning the identification and definition of development priorities. While the MDGs were produced by a group of experts behind closed doors, the SDGs have been the outcome of an intense and negotiation process that involved all the UN member states but also unprecedented participation of civil society organisations and activists, as well as of other stakeholders, leading the drafting and adoption of the Agenda 2030 to be the most inclusive and participatory process in the UN history, as acknowledged by the UN themselves.

A consequence of this large multi-actor participation is that the SDGs represent a wide range of interests and perspectives. Moreover, SDGs are broad in scope because they are expected to address the interconnected elements which makes up sustainable development: economic growth, social inclusion, human rights and environmental protection. This marks another major difference with the MDGs framework, which was focused primarily on the social agenda.

Another fundamental transformation between the two frameworks concerns the field of applicability: while the MDGs targeted developing countries only, also leading some analysts, civil society activists and observers to the perception that the richest countries had dominated their formulation and could have used the MDGs to hold poor countries accountable for development failures (Fukuda-Parr 2013), the Agenda 2030 and its SDGs have been conceived and defined to be applied to the entire world. As the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018) acknowledges, all countries have progress to make in the path towards sustainable development, and face both common and unique challenges to achieving the many dimensions of sustainable development captured in the SDGs. Connected to this universal nature and scope of SDGs, as some scholars point out "they are also expected to be adapted to the national and local context by taking into account a number of factors, such as the level of development and existing national and local policies. This is a significant departure from the MDGs that had been set at the global level and were hence often criticized for its 'one-size-fits-all' approach" (Biermanna et al. 2017).

3.3. The 2030 Agenda and Human Rights

Besides all the differences and transformations highlighted in the previous section, an actual watershed between the past and the present global development frameworks is represented by how the two agendas deal with, refer to and integrate international human rights standards.

Of course, already in the Millennium Declaration there were more or less explicit overlapping and cross-references between the MDGs and the broader international human rights paradigm, especially as far as social and economic rights were concerned (for instance the MDGs connected to improving maternal health, achieving universal primary education, empowering women). Yet, one of the main criticisms addressed to the Millennium Declaration framework and its objectives and targets was precisely that the MDGs had ignored many possible human rights linkages and interrelations, neglecting, in fact, also the core principle of interdependence and indivisibility of human rights (OHCHR 2018a).

According to Fukuda-Parr (2013), moreover, although contributing to fulfil some human rights, MDGs did not go far enough to realize them: for example, she argues, "to fulfil human rights requires eliminating, not just halving, poverty. The MDGs do not give adequate priority to the most deprived; halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty and hunger can be achieved by improving the well-being of the best off amongst them".

The 2030 Agenda, by contrast, is entirely grounded in international human rights law. According to a research project of the Danish Institute for Human Rights (2017) - Denmark's national independent institution for human rights, more than 90% of the SDGs targets reflect core international human rights and labour standards. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda, therefore, can also be assessed from a human rights perspective.

On this basis, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda by the international community can be observed as a resolved and unprecedented step in the concrete application of what is referred to as a "Human-Rights Based Approach to development" (HRBA) (see Alston and Robinson 2005; Arts 2017). The HRBA, which is currently adopted as a common understanding among all UN agen-

cies, originated at the beginning of the 1990s and developed in the very fertile ground for human rights and global civil society represented by those years, as demonstrated, for instance, the effort by former UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali and by other UN officials to functionally link and integrate the development, democracy, peace and, ultimately, human rights global agendas or by the Declaration and Plan of Action of the Vienna World Conference on human rights of 1993. HRBA differs from more traditional approaches in that, in pursuing a human dignity centred approach to development, "it seeks to analyse the inequalities which lie at the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power by integrating human rights in all aspects and phases of the development cooperation process" (Fukuda-Parr 2013). HRBA is therefore complementary to, mutually reinforcing and sometimes overlapping with the broader concept of human development and with the capabilities approach championed, in particular, by the UNDP and its annual reports as elaborated in section 3.1.

Insight Box 10 - The UN common understanding on Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation

The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation (HRBA), as elaborated by the UN Development Group (UNDG) is based on a common understanding based on these three points:

1. All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance should further the realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments.

A set of programme activities that only incidentally contributes to the realization of human rights does not necessarily constitute a human rights-based approach to programming. In a human rights-based approach to programming and development cooperation, the aim of all activities is to contribute directly to the realization of one or several human rights.

2. Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process.

Human Rights principles guide programming in all sectors, such as: health, education, governance, nutrition, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, employment and labour relations and social and economic security.

This includes all development cooperation directed towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the Millennium Declaration. Consequently, human rights standards and principles guide both the Common Country Assessment and the UN Development Assistance Framework. Human rights principles guide all programming in all phases of the programming process, including assessment and analysis, programme planning and design (including setting of goals, objectives and strategies); implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Among these human rights principles are: universality and inalienability; indivisibility; interdependence and inter-relatedness; non-discrimination and equality; participation and inclusion; accountability and the rule of law [...].

3. Programmes of development cooperation contribute to the development of the capacities of duty-bearers to meet their obligations and of 'rights-holders' to claim their rights.

In a HRBA human rights determine the relationship between individuals and groups with valid claims (rights-holders) and State and non-state actors with correlative obligations (duty- bearers). It identifies rights-holders (and their entitlements) and corresponding duty-bearers (and their obligations) and works towards strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to make their claims, and of duty-bearers to meet their obligations.

Source: UNDG 2003.

Besides being grounded in human rights law, there are many other ways in which the 2030 Agenda embodies and puts in practice the principles of HRBA. First, it encapsulates the principles of equality, non-discrimination, participation and accountability, which are at the core of the human rights normative framework (Osmani 2013). As stressed by the OHCHR (2018), the SDGs constitute a transformative vision for people- and planet-centred, human rights-based and gender-sensitive sustainable development, which is universal both in its scope of application (since it is applicable to all countries) and in terms of the categories of human rights advanced through its implementation.

Alongside a wide range of social, economic and environmental objectives, the 2030 Agenda indeed promises "more peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence" with attention to democratic governance, rule of law, access to justice and personal security, for elements of process such as meaningful participation and accountability (in Goal 16), as well as an enabling international environment (in Goal 17 and throughout the framework).

Moreover, as some have pointed out, the need to address both the manifestations and the structural causes of inequality has resulted in a more tangible emphasis on combating discrimination and violence than was the case before, especially as far as women and children are concerned. Indeed, as also highlighted by the Danish Institute for Human Rights (2017), the presence of an effort to advance equality and non-discrimination to ensure progress across all groups of society is another key aspect linking the Agenda 2030 and human rights especially through the cross-cutting principle of "leaving no one behind" (with the connected commitment to "reaching the furthest behind first"), which has been recognised as one of the most transformative elements of the whole development framework.

Such effort is particularly visible in SDG 5, which calls for gender equality, and SDG 10 that focuses on the broader commitment needed to reduce inequalities within and among countries. In can be observed well in a number of specific targets, including 5.c, 10.3 and 16.b, which emphasise the need to promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws as well as in other SDGs targets, since the global efforts against discrimination and inequalities are transversal to the whole 2030 Agenda.

The global commitment to advance equality and non-discrimination and to reach the furthest behind first in order to leave no one behind needs to be ensured also with regards to the monitoring of the 2030 Agenda implementation. As the Danish Institute for Human Rights (2017) acknowledges, the principles of accountability, participation and non-discrimination are at the core of the Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) to development and are also strongly

emphasized in the 2030 Agenda, which stipulates that follow-up and reviews mechanisms developed at the national, regional and global level should among others:

- **promote respect for human rights and accountability to citizens;**

- **have a particular focus on vulnerable groups and those furthest behind;**

- **ensure inclusion, participation, and transparency;**

- **and generate data, which is high-quality, accessible, timely, reliable and disaggregated by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migration status, disability and geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.**

The issue of collecting disaggregated data is particularly sensitive in this regard, and the attention reserved to their importance in the context of the SDGs can be observed as another major difference between the 2030 Agenda and the MDGs framework, which was also criticised for not giving enough priority to the most deprived and, connectedly, for not having developed enough indicators revealing discrimination and inequality to build an effective framework of accountability for human rights (OHCHR 2018a; Fukuda-Parr 2013). The reason for the relevance of disaggregation, which together with self-identification, participation, transparency, accountability and privacy, is one of the six components of the UN definition of what makes up a HRBA approach to data (OHCHR 2018b), has been well explained by the President of the Human Rights Council in addressing the High Level Political Forum for the 2030 Agenda in 2016:

> *"In a world of rising inequalities both between and within countries, disaggregated data are essential to adequately map and target those further behind first. The Human Rights Council has repeatedly underlined that reliable information and disaggregated data are essential for the assessment of progress in the realization of human rights and to help States meet their human rights commitments. Numerous recommendations coming out of the Universal Periodic Review mechanism and from Special Procedures mandate holders call for the development of data disaggregated by vulnerable or marginalised groups, in keeping with international human*

rights instruments. The latter enumerates prohibited grounds of discrimination that represent authoritative and practical references for data disaggregation (Human Rights Council 2016)".

With a view to contribute to the monitoring and review of the 2030 Agenda implementation, the UN and its specialised organisms have developed a wealth of tools to connect the SDGs and human rights. In particular, the Universal Human Rights Index, a comprehensive database collecting all recommendations adopted by the UN human rights machinery can also be searched through a SDGs filter. Another interesting perspective from which to look at the operational relationship between SDGs and human rights commitments is represented by the UPR-SDGs data explorer. This is a research tool developed by the Danish Institute for Human Rights which allows to related the thousands of mutual recommendations adopted in the context of the Universal Periodic Review - a Human Rights Council's state-driven mechanism based on peer review which aims at improving the human rights situation on the ground worldwide, by scrutinising on a regular basis the situation in each of the 193 UN member states - and SDGs.

According to this tool, more than 53% of the about 68,000 recommendations that UN member states have mutually addressed on human rights issues since 2008 can be linked to one or more SDGs, with main peaks related to SDGs 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 (see the distribution in the figure below).

Figure 2 - Distribution of UPR recommendations according to SDG

Source: The Danish Institute for Human Rights 2017, UPR-SDGs data explorer.

A significant regional novelty in the framework of the global efforts to advance a human-centred sustainable development is the African Union's "2063 Agenda: The Africa We Want", which was adopted in 2013 following the Golden Jubilee Summit of the Organization of the African Unity (1953-2013). This agenda is expected to fulfil the pan-African vision, reinstated solemnly during the summit of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena. The 2063 Agenda, developed over 7 aspirations and based on 20 goals, tries to prioritise inclusive social and economic development, continental and regional integration, democratic governance and peace and security amongst other issues aimed at repositioning Africa to becoming a dominant player in the global arena. Despite many goals and aspirations are context-specific, the 2063 Agenda is in many aspects connected and mutually reinforcing with the goals of the 2030 Agenda, as summarised in the table below.

Table 1- Links between African Agenda and 2030 Agenda

AU Agenda 2063 Goals	UN Agenda 2030 Goals
1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens.	1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere in the world 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable Economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
2. Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innova- tion.	4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens.	3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.
4. Transformed economies.	8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.
5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production.	2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.
6. Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth.	14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.

7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities.	6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.
8. A United Africa (Federal or Confederate).	
9. Continental financial and monetary institutions established and functional.	
10. World class infrastructure criss - crosses Africa.	9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.
11. Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched.	16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
12. Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place.	16.Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
13. Peace, security and stability is preserved.	16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
14. A stable and peaceful Africa.	

15. A fully functional and operational APSA	
16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent	
17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life.	5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
18. Engaged and empowered youth and children.	4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence.	17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.
20. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development Goals.	10. Reduce inequality within and among countries. 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.

Source: extrapolation from African Union, 2063 Agenda:

https://au.int/agenda2063/sdgs.

4. PEACE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, MIGRATIONS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

4.1 Peace, sustainable development and migrations

As evidenced in the previous Chapter of this Manual, the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development constitutes an inclusive strategy of action for the promotion of human-centred development, able to "leave no one behind". According to the Report of the United Nations Secretary General, "Making migration work for all" (UN General Assembly, 2017), there should be a strong linkage between the promotion of sustainable development and the implementation of a global agenda on migrations. Migration is a cross cutting issue, relevant to all of 17 the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 169 targets. The SDGs' central reference to migration is made in target 10.7 to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies. This target appears under Goal 10, which aims at reducing inequality within and among countries. Other targets that directly reference migration mention trafficking, remittances or international student mobility.

Migration as defined by the IOM (2018) includes the movement of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification. Regular migration is defined as a voluntary movement of people seeking better economic and social opportunities, or different lifestyles. More than three percent of the world's population are regular migrants. In contrast, irregular or forced migration, involuntary by nature, is a smaller but highly significant international migratory movement (Zetter 2014). So-called regular migrants and forced migrants (asylum seekers and refugees) receive different treatment under international law, based on their different reasons for moving. People who are deemed to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted fall within the specific terms of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the following 1967 Protocol and are labelled refugees. Yet, today, refugee and migratory movements increasingly intersect (UNHCR 2016). The result are so-called mixed migration movements, driven by multiple factors and generally of irregular nature.

Recent years have witnessed an increasing emergence of migrations as a global phenomenon. According to the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS), "We are an international community increasingly on the move: 244 million people crossed borders to become international migrants in 2015. Many people who moved in 2015 did so voluntarily. However, around 65.3 million were forcibly displaced as a result of factors including conflict, food insecurity and climate change. Among them, 21.3 million were refugees, forced to cross borders due to violence and fear of persecution. Many of those who fled came from escalating conflicts in Syria and Iraq or long-running conflicts in Somalia and Afghanistan. Half of those fleeing were under the age of 18". Due to its complexity and its effects on various dimensions of individual and collective life, the issue of migrations should be seen as a crucial part of the international debate on peace and sustainable development.

In order to address the emergences and necessities connected with the migration flow through international coordinated efforts, on 19 September 2016 Heads of State and Government came together for the first time ever at the global level within the UN General Assembly to discuss issues related to migration and refugees. On that day, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was adopted by the 193 UN Member States in order to recognize the need for a comprehensive approach to human mobility and enhanced cooperation at the global level. The Declaration was the sign that migration and refugee matters had become a major issue squarely in the international agenda. In adopting the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Member States committed to:

- **protect the safety, dignity and human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migratory status, and at all times;**

- **support countries rescuing, receiving and hosting large numbers of refugees and migrants;**

- **integrate migrants – addressing their needs and capacities as well as those of receiving communities – in humanitarian and development assistance frameworks and planning;**

- **combat xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards all migrants**

- **develop, through a state-led process, non-binding principles and voluntary guidelines on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations; and**

- **strengthen global governance of migration.**

The New York Declaration set in motion a process of intergovernmental consultations and negotiations towards the development of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. This process concluded on 10 December 2018 with the adoption of the Global Compact by the majority of UN Member States at an Intergovernmental Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco, followed closely by formal endorsement by the UN General Assembly on 19 December.

The Global Compact is the first inter-governmentally negotiated agreement, prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, covering all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner. It is a non-binding document that respects states' sovereign right to determine who enters and stays in their territory and demonstrates commitment to international cooperation on migration. It presents a significant opportunity to improve the governance of migration, to address the challenges associated with today's migration, and to strengthen the contribution of migrants and migration to sustainable development. The Global Compact is framed in a way consistent with target 10.7 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in which Member States committed to cooperate internationally to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration. The Global Compact is designed to: 1) support international cooperation on the governance of international migration; 2) provide a comprehensive menu of options for states from which they can select policy options to address some of the most pressing issues around international migrations; and 3) give states the space and flexibility to pursue implementation based on their own migration realities and capacities.

The Global Compact was developed through an open, transparent and inclusive process of consultations and negotiations and the effective participation of all relevant stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, academic institutions, parliaments, diaspora communities, and migrant organizations in both the intergovernmental conference and its preparatory process. This open process of consultations allowed the Global Compact to address all aspects of international migration, including the humanitarian, developmental, human

rights-related and other aspects. Recalling the most important principles enshrined in the international human rights principles, the Global Compact recognizes migration as "part of the human experience throughout history and [...] a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development in our globalized world" (UN GA 2018, par. 8).

This document stressed the need of "international efforts to strengthen our knowledge and analysis of migration as shared understandings will improve policies that unlock the potential of sustainable development for all". It also underlines that "a comprehensive approach is needed to optimize the overall benefits of migration, while addressing risks and challenges for individuals and communities in countries of origin, transit and destination". Based on a set of well-defined principles (see Insight Box 11), the Global Compact proposed a specific "cooperative framework", comprising 23 objectives, their implementation, as well as follow-up and review.

The 23 "objectives for safe, orderly and regular migration" established by the Global Compact can be summarized as following: 1. Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence -based policies; 2. Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin; 3. Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration; 4. Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation; 5. Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration; 6. Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work; 7. Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration; 8. Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants; 9. Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants; 10. Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration; 11. Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner; 12. Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral; 13. Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives; 14. Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle; 15. Provide access to basic services for migrants; 16. Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion; 17. Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration; 18. Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of

skills, qualifications and competences; 19. Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries; 20. Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants; 21. Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration; 22. Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits; 23. Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration.

According to the Report of the United Nations Secretary General, "Making migration work for all", there should be strong interconnection between the objectives of the Global Compact and the realization of the targets connected with the Sustainable Development Goals: "wherever possible, Member States should aim to link such processes to the follow-up mechanisms for the 2030 Agenda in order to emphasize the positive links between development and migration" (UN General Assembly, 2017, par. 83).

Insight Box 11 - Cross-cutting and interdependent principles of the Global Compact

(a) People-centred. The Global Compact carries a strong human dimension, inherent to the migration experience itself. It promotes the well-being of migrants and the members of communities in countries of origin, transit and destination. As a result, the Global Compact places individuals at its core;

(b) International cooperation. The Global Compact is a non-legally binding cooperative framework that recognizes that no State can address migration on its own because of the inherently transnational nature of the phenomenon. It requires international, regional and bilateral cooperation and dialogue. Its authority rests on its consensual nature, credibility, collective ownership, joint implementation, follow-up and review;

(c) National sovereignty. The Global Compact reaffirms the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law. Within their sovereign jurisdiction, States may distinguish between regular and irregular migration status, including as they determine their legislative and policy measures for the implementation of the Global Compact, taking into account different national realities, policies, priorities and requirements for entry, residence and work, in accordance with international law;

(d) Rule of law and due process. The Global Compact recognizes that respect for the rule of law, due process and access to justice are fundamental to all aspects of migration governance. This means that the State, public and private institutions and entities, as well as persons themselves, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and are consistent with international law;

(e) Sustainable development. The Global Compact is rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and builds upon its recognition that migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the sustainable development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. Migration contributes to positive development outcomes and to realizing the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially when it is properly managed. The Global Compact aims to leverage the potential of migration for the achievement of all Sustainable Development;

(f) Human rights. The Global Compact is based on international human rights law and upholds the principles of non-regression and non-discrimination. By implementing the Global Compact, we ensure effective respect for and protection and fulfilment of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, across all stages of the migration cycle. We also reaffirm the commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and intolerance, against migrants and their families;

g) Gender-responsive. The Global Compact ensures that the human rights of women, men, girls and boys are respected at all stages of migration, that their specific needs are properly understood and addressed and that they are empowered as agents of change. It mainstreams a gender perspective and promotes gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls, recognizing their independence, agency and leadership in order to move away from addressing migrant women primarily through a lens of victimhood;

(h) Child-sensitive. The Global Compact promotes existing international legal obligations in relation to the rights of the child, and upholds the principle of the best interests of the child at all times, as a primary consideration in all situations concerning children in the context of international migration, including unaccompanied and separated children;

(i) Whole-of-government approach. The Global Compact considers that migration is a multidimensional reality that cannot be addressed by one gov-

ernment policy sector alone. To develop and implement effective migration policies and practices, a whole-of-government approach is needed to ensure horizontal and vertical policy coherence across all sectors and levels of government;

(j) Whole-of-society approach. The Global Compact promotes broad multi-stakeholder partnerships to address migration in all its dimensions by including migrants, diasporas, local communities, civil society, academia, the private sector, parliamentarians, trade unions, national human rights institutions, the media and other relevant stakeholders in migration governance.

Source: UN General Assembly, 2018

4.2 Peace, sustainable development and social justice

The discussion of the linkages among the SDGs, the recent Global Compact (UN General Assembly, 2018) and the phenomenon of migrations recalls the broader interconnection between sustainable development and the concept of social justice.

According to the International Forum for Social Development (2006), social justice is a complex and multi-dimensional concept whose meaning has a strong connection with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (see Insight Box 12). Social justice can be defined as a virtue or societal value that guides human interaction and, in particular, the fair distribution of society's benefits, advantages, and assets, not just by law and in the courts but in all aspects of society. Social justice is about securing rights but also about our responsibilities and their consequences. It focuses our attention on the relative position of different members of our society and on examining the disparities that might exist, the root causes of these disparities, and the opportunities for eliminating them. Understanding disparities requires us to adopt a systemic analysis of our social context—the institutions (e.g., legal, education, media), infrastructures, and belief systems that shape this distribution.

Social justice is linked to the concept of equity and the just treatment of individuals in their own social context to meet their needs and reach their potential. It is also linked to the notion of equality as a socially just society is a "society for all" that provides an equal basis of opportunity. Fundamentally, it asks us to pose the question: "Is society just?".

Insight Box 12 - The concept of social justice and the Charter of the United Nations

The notion of social justice is relatively new. None of history's great philosophers—not Plato, or Aristotle, or Confucius or Averroes, or even Rousseau or Kant—saw the need to consider justice or the redress of injustices from a social perspective. The concept first surfaced in Western thought and political language in the wake of the industrial revolution and the parallel development of the socialist doctrine. It emerged as an expression of protest against what was perceived as the capitalist exploitation of labour and as a focal point for the development of measures to improve the human condition. It was born as a revolutionary slogan embodying the ideals of progress and fraternity. Following the revolutions that shook Europe in the mid-1800s, social justice became a rallying cry for progressive thinkers and political activists. [...] By the mid-twentieth century, the concept of social justice had become central to the ideologies and programmes of virtually all the leftist and centrist political parties around the world, and few dared to oppose it directly. Social justice represented the essence and the raison d'être of the social democrat doctrine and left its mark in the decades following the Second World War. [...]

The application of social justice requires a geographical, sociological, political and cultural framework within which relations between individuals and groups can be understood, assessed, and characterized as just or unjust. In modern times, this framework has been the nation-State. The country typically represents the context in which various aspects of social justice, such as the distribution of income in a population, are observed and measured; this benchmark is used not only by national Governments but also by international organizations and supranational entities such as the European Union. At the same time, there is clearly a universal dimension to social justice, with humanity as the common factor. Slaves, exploited workers and oppressed women are above all victimized human beings whose location matters less than their circumstances. This universality has taken on added depth and relevance as the physical and cultural distance between the world's peoples has effectively shrunk. [...]

For what concerns the United Nations Charter, it may be argued that while not explicitly stated, justice among people and for all the world's peoples is its fundamental rationale. These priorities fall under the heading of international justice, whereby Governments are compelled to represent and serve their populations and act in their best interest, without discrimination, and the sovereign equality of all States is respected. In the Preamble to the Char-

ter, the commitment to justice for people is expressed as a reaffirmation of "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women". It requires the promotion of "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" and of "the economic and social advancement of all peoples". It underlies the third stated purpose of the United Nations (after maintaining peace and friendly relations among nations), which is "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (Article 1). This purpose is then reiterated in Article 13 as one of the functions of the General Assembly, and in Articles 60 and 62 in reference to the role of the Economic and Social Council in this regard. In short, justice derives from equality of rights for all peoples and the possibility for all human beings, without discrimination, to benefit from the economic and social progress disseminated and secured through international cooperation.

Source: International Forum for Social Development (2006)

The International Forum for Social Development has identified six critical areas of priority that should guide the international agenda on the promotion of social justice.

First, the Forum underlined that there is a close link between civil and political rights and economic and social development. According to this holistic vision, peace, development and human rights should be considered as indivisible.

Secondly, the Forum maintained that the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference by outside parties in a country's domestic affairs can no longer be invoked by Governments to escape the consequences of abuses perpetrated against citizens. Some form of what is referred to as the "right of intervention", applicable to all, must be established within the framework of international law under the aegis of the United Nations. The development of humanitarian law and the establishment of the International Criminal Court should be seen as signs of progress reflecting the emergence of a global awareness that respect for human rights and human dignity should ignore borders.

Thirdly, the Forum recognized that the notion of equal rights should be seen as the foundation of social justice and as an important part of the inter-

national discourse of the global consciousness. The idea that all members of the human family have equal and inalienable rights - irrespective of their socio-economic status, gender, origins, or group affiliation - is identified as being the instrument for promoting social justice in different societies around the globe. According to this principle of equality, it is possible to achieve considerable progresses toward achieving better conditions for women, indigenous people, persons with disabilities, migrant workers and other vulnerable groups. The principle of equality will assure that, in the future, inherited rank and privilege will be probably used less frequently to claim the right to special treatment before the law.

As a fourth point, the Forum underlined that the realization of equality of opportunities requires for countries an active engagement for giving to all participating in the world economy the same chances. According to this, it can be argued that international justice is more likely to be achieved through responsibility and partnership in a context of openness, than through the perpetuation of the North-South relationship. This is in line with the concept of international justice, which incorporates an element of charity for those seriously disadvantaged. Such charity is seen as temporary, however, for the objective of international organizations is to bring all nations into the mainstream of the global economy. Ultimately, the distinction between developed, developing and least developed countries should disappear as all nations and regional groupings compete and cooperate within an evolving global milieu.

As a fifth point, the Forum stressed that for individuals and groups, equality of opportunities essentially means the absence of discrimination and the existence of a climate of social freedom in which each person can engage in productive work and being fairly compensated for such activity on the basis of talent, effort and other personal attributes. This notion is coherent with the principles enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and specifically, in article 6 and article 7. In article 6, recognition is given to the "right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts". Paragraph (c) of article 7 emphasizes the need to ensure "equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence". The basic idea, applicable also for promoting the absence of discrimination between men and

women, is that equality should be understood as equality of opportunity within the broader context of economic justice.

Finally, the Forum maintained that the promotion of social justice at international level should go hands in hands with an increased role recognized to non-states and non-public actors. Since "justice, including social justice, can no longer be the sole responsibility of public institutions; it requires the active involvement of all segments of society", civil society organizations should be recognized as key partners in promoting equality and non-discrimination. Initiated in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (1992) and further reinforced within the framework of the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen (1995) and the World Conference on Women and Development in Beijing (1995), the participation of NGOs is seen as being firmly established in the normative and operational framework of United Nations for what concerns development and social justice.

As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the engagement of United Nations for promoting sustainable development together with social justice is clearly visible in the five principles put at the basis of the 2030 Agenda ("People", "Planet", "Prosperity", "Peace" and "Partnership"). In particular, Goal 10 (Reduce inequalities within and among countries) and Goal 16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development) are those that present the stronger linkages with the idea of social justice and the connected United Nations' mission as described by the International Forum for Social Development (2006). Goal 10 aims at eradicating the inequalities based on income, sex, age, disability, sexual orientation, race, class ethnicity, religion and opportunity continue to persist across the world, within and among countries. The main idea behind this Goal is that inequality threatens long-term social and economic development, harms poverty reduction and destroys people's sense of fulfilment and self-worth. To achieve equality, the Agenda 2030 stresses the need of promoting a transformative change and of investing more in health, education, social protection and decent jobs especially for young people, migrants and other vulnerable communities. Within countries, it is important to promote inclusive social and economic growth by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices. Among countries, it is important to ensure that developing countries are better represented in decision-making on global issues. For what concerns Goal 16, it aims at advancing the SDGs through effective and inclu-

sive public institutions that can deliver quality education and health care, fair economic policies and inclusive environmental protection. In order for sustainable development to be achieved for all, the Agenda 2030 underlines that it is important that governments, civil society and communities work together to implement lasting solutions to reduce violence, deliver justice, combat corruption and ensure inclusive participation at all times. The importance of putting inclusion and social justice at the centre of SDGs has been recognized as the true guarantee that Agenda 2030 will bring positive and transformative change for all (see Insight Box 13).

Insight Box 13 - The importance of social inclusion for pursuing the objectives of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

It is unlikely that development will be sustainable unless it is inclusive. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development thus needs to be an inclusive plan of action, pursuing the goal of leaving no one behind in a way that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to participate in the processes that impact their lives. Social policies that promote practices based on universal rights-based entitlements, equal and meaningful participation, as well as norms of solidarity and reciprocity, while paying due respect to diversity and the environment, are more likely to enable social inclusion. It is therefore necessary to move away from the use of social inclusion schemes as remedial action towards making them an intrinsic part of broader and coherent development strategies. Government interventions in the form of enhancement of productive capacities, improved access to quality social services, adequate social protection and decent work are crucial to achieving socially inclusive, broad-based and sustainable development. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that these interventions alone would not automatically ensure the desired outcomes. It is necessary to examine social relations within which economy and society are embedded.

The implementation of socially inclusive policies is the responsibility of all societal actors, including governments, civil society, private sector and society at large. It is vital to promote and encourage partnerships between different actors and sectors to implement these policies. Yet it is the role of the state to establish mechanisms that would facilitate the involvement of all these important actors at national and local levels. Comprehensive social policy is one of such mechanisms that promotes sustainable development in which all hu-

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man beings have a right to a decent livelihood and are allowed to participate on equal terms in decisions-making processes.

At the same time, it is essential to recognize that processes of social inclusion are always locally specific and historically contingent. Each country needs to formulate policies and strategies based on its specific circumstances, resource base, and cultural and institutional set-up. The task is therefore not so much how to expand social inclusion per se, but how to promote a kind of inclusion that favours the creation of a more equitable society.

Finally, while it is necessary to understand the interlinkage between social inclusion and poverty eradication, it is equally important to attain policy coherence that recognizes the need for more integrated approaches to policy design and implementation, promotes complementarities and synergies among policies, while minimizing trade-offs that may undermine progress on core development objectives. This should be central to achieving sustainable development outcomes in the 2030 Agenda for global action.

Source: Dugarova 2015.

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